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of children than are current standards and resolves all doubts in
favor of the children.
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INTRODUCTION

The parental use of corporal punishment 1 is common but controversial.2 When parents administer corporal punishment, the practice raises
a host of legal issues. Those issues play out against a societal backdrop
of heightened sensitivity to state intrusion into family privacy on the one
hand3 and increased awareness of child abuse on the other. 4 The legal
issues involving the parental use of corporal punishment implicate two
sets of concerns: courts must determine whether parents have a
fundamental right to use corporal punishment and, if they do, how far
that right extends.

1.
Traditionally, and for the purposes of this Article, corporal punishment
involves the intentional infliction of physical force upon a child. See, e.g., lowA CODE
§ 234.40 (1994) ("intentional physical punishment ofa ... child"); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 1012 (McKinney 1995) ("intentional[] ... serious injury to a child"); see also MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1312(1) (West 1994) ("deliberate infliction of physical pain
by hitting, paddling, spanking, slapping, or any other physical force used as a means of
discipline"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 127.45(1) (West 1994) ("hitting or spanking a person
with or without an object; or ... unreasonable physical force that causes bodily harm
or substantial emotional harm"); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 15-47-47 (1993) ("willful infliction
of, willfully causing the infliction of, or willfully allowing the infliction of physical pain
on a pupil").
See Spare the Rod? Mother Arrested for Slapping Child, Chi. TRIB., July 1,
2.
1994, § 1, at 7 (discussing controversy surrounding felony charges .brought against a
mother who slapped her nine-year-old son in a grocery store). As of the writing of this
Article, charges are still pending against the mother.
3.
For example, two recent state supreme court decisions awarding biological
parents custody of their children after the children had been living with their adoptive
parents have received widespread attention. See In re Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181
(III. 1994); In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993).
For example, one newspaper's year-long investigation into the deaths of
4.
children in its community found that one leading cause of death was abuse by parents
or a boyfriend of the child's mother. See Steve Johnson, Killing Our Children, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 1, 1993, § 1, at 1.
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This Article addresses both of those issues. The Article first
concludes that parents who use corporal punishment should not receive
the heightened protection conferred by a fundamental right because their
interests are already adequately safeguarded by the political process.
Second, to the extent that the political process chooses to perm.it parents
to administer reasonable corporal punishment, courts should abandon the
current test which defines the scope of that reasonableness and adopt the
test proposed by this Article because it is sensitive to the interests of
those m.ost in need of protection under this right: children.
Part II of this Article considers the status of the parental right of
corporal punishment and concludes that it should not be considered a
fundamental right. If the Supreme Court recognized this practice as a
fundamental, parental right, then the state could not restrict its use unless
it had a compelling reason for doing so. The question of how something
becomes a fundamental right has occupied the Court's and
com.m.entators' attention for years. Part II of this Article is divided into
four sections, and each section considers a different potential source of
a fundamental, parental right.
The Court first turns to its past opinions on the subject. 5 No Supreme
Court case has raised the issue of whether parents have a fundamental
right to corporally punish their children. Those cases which recognize
a fundamental, parental right to direct the upbringing of their children
are silent on whether that right includes the right of corporal punishm.ent.6 In a different context, the Court affirmed the right of schools to
administer reasonable corporal punishment to their students without
violating either the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth
Am.endm.ent or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Am.endm.ent. 7
These cases, however, do not answer the question of whether parents
have a fundamental right of corporal punishment, and thus, the Court
cannot rely on them. alone as a basis for such a right.
The second source considered in establishing a fundamental right is
located in history and tradition. 8 History and tradition have been
criticized as a source of fundamental rights because of difficulties both
5.

See discussion infra part II.A.
See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society of the
Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
7.
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 683 (1977).
8. See discussion infra part II.B.

6.
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in determining what constitutes a tradition and in using tradition to
protect the interests of minorities. 9 The Supreme Court's debate in
Michael H. v. Gerald D. 10 about the use of history and tradition to
establish fundamental rights underscores the problems with relying on
that source. In that case, Justices Scalia's and Brennan's differing
readings of history and tradition prevented them from reaching a
consensus about whose interests were protected by a fundamental
right. 11 A similar debate forecloses any consensus about whether
history and tradition can serve to establish a fundamental right of
parental corporal punishment.
A third source of fundamental rights, contemporary norms or the
"evolving standards of decency," 12 raises similar problems to those
presented by using history and tradition as a source of fundamental
rights. 13 The evolving standards of decency are perhaps more difficult
to define than any other source of fundamental rights. The definitional
problems involve figuring out whether those standards can be derived
from a common experience, whether they can be pinpointed in time, and
whether courts are equipped to define them. 14 These three concerns
effectively prevent the evolving standards of decency from acting as a
basis for establishing a fundamental right of corporal punishment.
The last section of Part II concludes that the political process
adequately protects parents' interests in using corporal punishment. 15
The public has signaled its approval of corporal punishment through
legislation which allows parents to administer reasonable corporal
punishment. Even if that ability is threatened, parents can use the
political process to protect their interests. As adults, parents have the
right to vote, and they can exercise that right to change laws that they
feel unduly limit their ability to administer corporal punishment.
Because the majoritarian process safeguards parents' interests, they do
not need the additional, constitutional protection of a fundamental right
of corporal punishment. Fundamental rights should protect minority
interests, and parents who use corporal punishment do not fall into that
category.

9.
John Hart Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 5, 29-33 (1978).
10.
491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion).
Compare id. at 124-25 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion), with id. at 139-40
11.
(Brennan, ·J., dissenting).
12. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
13.
See discussion infra part II.C.
14.
See Ely, supra note 9, at 43-52.
15.
See discussion infra part II.D.
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Given the fact that the majoritarian process protects parents' interest
in reasonable corporal punishment, this Article also considers the
question of what constitutes reasonable corporal punishment. Part III
evaluates the current test for determining the reasonableness of parental
corporal punishment, explains its deficiencies, and proposes a new test.
Under the current test, courts consider the parents' intent in administering the corporal punishment, the nature of the force, and the surrounding
circumstances. 16 Courts will balance these factors to determine
whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the parents' conduct
was reasonable.
This test is flawed in two respects. First, this test will not enable
courts to reach a consensus about the parameters of reasonable corporal
punishment. Because the test is subject to differing interpretations,
parents cannot rely on it to guide their behavior. Second, and more
importantly, children cannot rely on this test to protect them from
physical abuse. The test preserves the interests of parents--a powerful
political group-at the expense of children-a politically isolated
minority The test ignores children, the group of people whose interests
are most affected by the parameters of the standard, and allows parents,
who may be motivated by self-interest, to set the limits on it. Therefore,
this test achieves the opposite of its intended effect: it protects the
interests of a powerful majority to the detriment of an isolated minority.
Children's interests were already ignored when the parental ability to use
reasonable corporal punishment was established through the political
process; they should not be overlooked for a second time as the
parameters of the right are determined.
This Article proposes a test for reasonableness that is more sensitive
to the interests of children. This new test evaluates the reasonableness
of parents' use of force with a series of five questions. These questions
require courts to review a parent's decision to use corporal punishment
by asking: (1) What was the parent's intent in administering the corporal
punishment? (2) To what was the parent responding? (3) What did the
parent do? (4) Could the corporal punishment have worked? (5) Did the
parent have any alternatives? The questions are interrelated, so, for
example, the milder the child's misconduct, the less tolerant a court
should be of parental use of corporal punishment. Because the questions
16.
OF TORTS

See MODEL PENAL CODE§ 3.08 (l)(a), (b) (1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
§ 147(1) (1965).
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are interrelated, they give a court some discretion in weighing and
evaluating them. Nevertheless, the standard also is clear in refusing to
tolerate certain uses of parental force regardless of the provocation or
any other circumstances. Some levels of force are so excessive or so
misintended that they are clearly outside the boundaries of what society
tolerates,. and there is no room for judicial discretion in balancing that
force against any of the other factors.
This new test better protects the interests of children. Even though
courts balance parents' and children's interests under both tests, the new
test requires courts to resolve all doubts in favor of the child. The new
test safeguards children's interests by holding parents to a higher level
of behavior. Most significantly, this test requires parents to have
exhausted other available alternatives before resorting to physical force.
In so doing, corporal punishment represents a last measure that parents
can use only after other means of discipline and education have been
tried and have failed.
This requirement, however, does not always work against a parent's
decision to use force. Parents who administer corporal punishment after
they have exhausted all available alternatives may be protected under
this standard. In one situation, the parental use of corporal punishment
was justified because the state had deprived the family of any alternatives.17 The state needs to ensure that parents have effective ways,
other than corporal punishment, that help them to educate and discipline
their children. If the state fails to provide alternatives, such as services
and programs, then it should not be able to intervene and take away
parents' rights of corporal punishment. Thus, the requirement that less
restrictive alternatives .be considered before corporal punishment is
imposed is attentive to the interests of parents but focuses on the need
of children to be kept safe from harm.
This Article concludes that the Supreme Court does not need to
recognize a fundamental right of parents to corporally punish their
children. If the majority of people determines that parents should be
able to use corporal punishment, then the political process can adequately protect that consensus. Given the legislative recognition of parents'
ability to administer reasonable corporal punishment, parents should not
be able to secure additional judicial protection· for their interests.
Instead, that judicial protection should be reserved for those who lack a
voice in the political process: children. Therefore, the courts should

17. See infra text accompanying notes 23 7-45 (discussing a situation where
parents chained their drug-addicted daughter to a radiator in their home after the state
ignored their pleas for assistance in dealing with her).
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abandon the current test for defining the scope of the parental right and
should adopt the test proposed in this Article. While the current test
preserves parents' interests at the expense of children's rights, the new
test is sensitive to the needs of children and safeguards their interests.

IL

POTENTIAL SOURCES OF A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF CORPORAL
PUNISHMENT

The Supreme Court has recognized certain interests as fundamental
rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 18
Some interests are considered· fundamental rights because they are
specifically mentioned in the Bill of Rights/ 9 while other interests not
enumerated in the Constitution may still be considered fundamental
rights. 20 Interests in this latter group can become fundamental rights
when they are so important to an individual's liberty that the Court
wants to protect these interests from unjustified state intrusion. 21
The importance of recognizing certain unenumerated rights as
fundamental lies in the increased level of protection accorded those
rights. Typically, the state can infringe on a non-fundamental right if it

18. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)
(overturning a state-law
restricting access to marriage and rioting that the right to marry is of "fundamental
importance"); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (holding
that the right to vote in state elections may not be burdened by the imposition of a state
poll tax); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down a state law
banning the use of contraceptives as violative of the right of marital privacy).
19. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (recognizing that the
notion of liberty embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment embraces the freedom of
religion guaranteed by the First Amendment); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359
(1931) (recognizing that the notion of liberty under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment includes the right of free speech guaranteed by the First
Amendment).
20. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (recognizing that fundamental rights may
be found in the "penumbras" of the Constitution).
21.
One of the most well-known instances of the Court's elevating an individual's
liberty interest to the level of a fundamental right can be found in Griswold, where the
Court affirmed a fundamental right to privacy when it determined that a law prohibiting
the use of contraceptives unconstitutionally infringed on a "relationship lying within the
zone of privacy." Id. at 485. Although the Court did not define the parameters of this
right to privacy, it endorsed the idea that a fundamental right could be located in the
"penumbras," not the text, of the .Constitution. Id, at 484; see also Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438,453 (1972) (discussing the right to privacy as "the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child").
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has a rational basis for doing so. Furthermore, the state can pass a law
restricting a non-fundamental right as long as that law is "rationally
related to a legitimate end of government."22 In contrast, the state
usually cannot interfere with a fundamental right unless it has a
compelling reason for doing so. 23 In those cases, the Court will use a
"strict scrutiny" approach to determine whether such an overwhelming
or compelling need exists. 24 This additional burden on the state to
justify its regulation of fundamental, as opposed to non-fundamental,
rights means that securing fundamental rights status may be critical to
preserving a particular interest.25
The Supreme Court can consult a variety of sources to determine
whether an interest deserves heightened constitutional protection, and
thus, fundamental right status. 26 The Court may first review its past
decisions to see how it has treated this interest, and may then look to
history, tradition, and contemporary social norms or evolving standards
of decency2 7 for additional guidance. The next three sections consider
whether these sources provide the Court with a basis for identifying and
defining a fundamental, parental right of corporal punishment.

A.

Supreme Court Cases

It is now well-settled law that the Court recognizes certain aspects of
the parent-child relationship as falling within the category of
unenumerated, fundamental rights. 28
To understand the Court's
perspective on the status of parents' rights as fundamental, one must
examine a line of Supreme Court cases dating back over seventy years.
In these cases, the Court recognized the fundamental right of parents to
direct the upbringing of their children and included within that right the
parental ability to make religious and educational choices for their
offspring. 29 The Court further observed that this right was not absolute
when it came into conflict with the state's interest in safeguarding the
22.
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 379 (4th
ed. 1991).
Id. at 574-75.
23.
Id. at 575.
24.
Id. at 388.
25.
See, e.g., Ely, supra note 9, at 16-51 (discussing possible sources the Court
26.
may use to identify fundamental rights).
27.
Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1957).
28.
See Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary,
268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); see also Francis B.
McCarthy, The Confused Constitutional Status and Meaning ofParental Rights, 22 GA.
L. REV. 975,985 (1988) (noting the status of parents' rights as fundamental rights).
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
29.
U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
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welfare of children. 30 The Court, however, has been silent about
whether the use of corporal punishment is considered part of this
fundamental, parental right, and if so, how far the parentalright extends.
In two decisions, the Supreme Court affirmed that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right of parents to
make educational choices for their children. In Meyer v. Nebraska, the
Court struck down a state law that prohibited the teaching of any
language but English to children in grade school. 31 In making this
determination, the Court noted that the Due Process Clause protects such
liberty interests as "the right of the individual ... to marry, establish a
home and bring up children."32 The parental right to bring up children
carries a corresponding duty to educate them, and parents therefore have
a liberty interest in choosing the kind of education that their children
receive. 33
Two years after Meyer, the Supreme Court determined that a state
compulsory education law requiring parents to send children of certain
ages only to public schools violated the Due Process Clause.34 In
Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary,
the Court noted that Meyer stood for the proposition that parents have
a liberty interest in "direct[ing] the upbringing and education of children
under their control."35 According to the Court, the parental interest
extended to the "right ... [and] duty, to recognize and prepare [children]
for additional obligations."36 In Pierce, that right gave parents -the
authority to select the kind of school that their children would attend. 37
In Meyer and Pierce, the Court .upheld the fundamental right of
parents to direct the upbringing of their children, at least in the context

30.
See Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
31. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403.
32. Id. at 399. In dicta, the Court contrasted the role that parents play in
American society to their role in ancient Greece. In American society, parents have the
responsibility for directing their children's education while the state had that authority
in ancient Greece. American society gives parents this authority over their children
because it values the role of the individual more highly than ancient Greece did. Thus,
the American legal system protects parental autonomy in making child-rearing decisions.
Id. at 401-02.
33.
Id. at 400.
34.
Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268
U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
35.- Id.
36.
Id. at 535.
37. Id.
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of making educational choices. Although the Court acknowledged the
state's interest in promoting the health and welfare of its citizens, 38 it
determined that the parents' interests should prevail in those cases.
Twenty years later, under different circumstances, the Supreme Court
returned to this balancing test when considering the parental right to
make child-rearing decisions against the state's interest in protecting the
health, welfare, and safety of children. This time, however, in Prince v.
Massachusetts, 39 the Court found the balance to favor the state and
upheld the constitutionality of a state child labor law that prohibited
children from selling newspapers in public places.40 The constitutionality of the statute was challenged by a nine-year-old girl and her guardian
who were distributing religious literature on the street during the
evening. They claimed that the statute violated the child's First
Amendment right to exercise her religion and the guardian's Fourteenth
Amendment right to "bring up the child in the way [she] should go,
which . . . means to teach [her] the tenets and the practices of their
faith." 41 Thus, the right of a parental figure to direct the religious
upbringing of a child was at stake in Prince. The Court determined that
this right was subject to certain state restrictions regarding the welfare
of children. 42
In examining the guardian's rights, the Court noted the difficulty of
balancing the interests between parent and state, especially when the
state is seeking to regulate how a family practices its religion. 43 The
Court cited Meyer and Pierce for the proposition that there exists a
"private realm of family life which the state cannot enter."44 The Court
recognized that parents have primary authority within this private realm
to make child-rearing decisions about their children: "It is cardinal with
us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for

38. The Court acknowledged the role of the state in Meyer and Pierce, but it
concluded that the parents' rights were preeminent. The Court reasoned "[t]hat the State
may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its citizens,
physically, mentally and morally ... but the individual has certain fundamental rights
which must be respected." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923). Similarly,
the Court noted that "[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture
him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations." Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
39.
321 U.S. 158 (1944).
40. Id. at 170-71.
41. Id. at 164.
42. Id. at 167.
43. Id. at 165.
44. Id. at 166.
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obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.',4 5 Their authority,
however, does not give parents exclusive control over their children's
upbringing. When parents exert control in a way that jeopardizes a
child's health, safety, or welfare, the state can use its parens patriae
power to intervene in the parent-child relationship to protect the child.46
In Prince, the Court expressed concern about the adverse effects of
child employment, particularly in public places,· and the accompanying
dangers of being on the street.47 The Court concluded that the state
had the authority to protect children from these dangers by banning them
from street preaching, although parents retained the right to make other
decisions about their children's religious training. 48 Thus, the Court
weighed the interests of the parents against those of the state and
decided that under those circumstances, the state could limit the parental
right to direct the religious upbringing of the child.
Thirty years later in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 49 the Supreme Court
balanced those interests in favor of the parents when it affirmed their
right to direct the religious upbringing of their children. 50 The Court
considered the interests of a group of Amish parents who argued that
they should not be required to send their children to school beyond the
eighth grade even though state law required children under the age of
sixteen to be enrolled in school. 51 Citing its decisions in Meyer,
Pierce, and Prince, the Court weighed "the traditional interest of parents
with respect to the religious upbringing of their children"52 against the
state's interests in compulsory education and child labor laws. 53 In
balancing those interests, the Court concluded that the Amish parents
were not jeopardizing the welfare of their children by withdrawing them
from school after the eighth grade. 54 Instead, they were properly
asserting their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to exercise their

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
with that
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 168.
Id. at 171.
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Id. at 231-32 (upholding the "fundamental interest of parents, as contrasted
of the State, to guide the religious future and education of their children").
Id. at 207-09.
Id. at 214.
Id. at 214-15, 228-29.
Id. at 234.
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religion and to '"prepare [their children] for additional obligations"' by
directing their religious upbringing. 55
In Meyer, Pierce, Prince, and Yoder, the Court endorsed the fundamental right of parents to direct the religious and educational upbringing
of their children, but it did not define the scope of that right. These
cases can be read narrowly to mean that the Court limited the parents'
rights to making only educational and religious choices for their
children. The debate in Meyer and Pierce focused on the parents' roles
in determining how and where their children should be taught, and the
discussion in Prince and Yoder addressed the parents' ability to direct
the religious upbringing of their children. Therefore, the Court may
have conferred a fundamental right on parents but confined their
authority to making only certain kinds· of decisions.
These cases also could be read more broadly to include the use of
corporal punishment within the scope of parents' fundamental rights. 56
The Court did not specifically limit the constitutional protection of
parental decisionmaking authority to choices about schooling and.
religious practices. In subsequent opinions, the Court cited these cases
for the principle of "traditional parental authority in matters of child
rearing and education"57 and the right to "raise one's children."58
These later cases arose when the Court was analyzing the substantive
due process rights of a grandmother who challenged a zoning ordinance
that defined family narrowly to exclude her relationship with her
grandsons59 and the rights of an unwed father who requested a hearing
before his parental rights were terminated.60 Thus, although the cases
still do not touch on corporal punishment, their language about the
parental right to direct the upbringing of one's children may supply the
underpinnings of a parental right of corporal punishment. 61 The

55. Id. at 233 (quoting Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of
Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)).
56. See, e.g., Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery:
Children's Perspectives and the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 37 (1994) (arguing that
"[t]he law characterizes the parent's right to punish a child as constitutional because the
right resides in a parent's broad constitutional right to the care, custody, and control of
[their] children").
57. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977) (plurality
opinion) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972); Pierce v. Society of
the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-401 (1923)).
58. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
59. Moore, 431 U.S. at 495-97.
60. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649.
61.
The authors of one article noted that the line of cases from Meyer to Yoder
addressed situations in which the interests of parents and children are united and are in
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Supreme Court, however, has never decided a case in which it considered whether the parental use of corporal punishment fell within the
scope of the fundamental right of parents to direct their children's
upbringing. We must look then to cases in which the Court addressed
the constitutionality of corporal punishment of children in other factual
contexts. 62
. In Ingraham v. Wright, 63 the Court determined that corporal punishment could be used to discipline children in public schools without
violating either the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.64
Although the Ingraham Court did not decide the case on substantive due
process grounds, the Court noted that in early school corporal punishopposition to the state's interests. See Lee E. Teitelbaum & James W. Ellis, The Liberty
Interest of Children: Due Process Rights and Their Application, 12 FAM. L.Q. 153, 170
(1978). In those situations, the parents should have more authority than the state to
decide how a child should be raised. The authors maintain that parental control over
children even extends to the parents' use of physical force on the children as a way of
preserving family harmony. Id. at 171. The authors suggest that perhaps this parental
use of discipline should be constitutionally protected but caution that it must only be
used to unite, rather than to disrupt, the family. Id. at 171-72; see also Fitzgerald, supra
note 56 (classifying parents' right to punish their children as constitutional).
Teitelbaum and Ellis are careful to distinguish the use of parental control in those
situations where the parents and children have the same interests from those cases in
which parents' and children's interests are in conflict. Teitelbaum & Ellis, supra,: at
168-69. When parents' and children's interests compete, courts must be careful not to
protect the parental interest at the expense of the children's rights. According to the
authors, the constitutional recognition of a parental right of control in the latter situation
would "create[] a sphere of personal domination which ... resembles the relationship
of the early Roman father over his children." Id. at 168. Furthermore, judicial approval
of a parental right of control would undermine a child's right of self-determination, and
thus, must be avoided. Id.
62.
See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Baker v. Owen, 395 F.
Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C.), aff'd without opinion, 423 U.S. 907 (1975). In Baker, the court
considered whether a parent's right to determine disciplinary measures for her son fell
within the parental right to provide for a child's "'custody, care and nurture'" as
established in Prince. Id. at 298 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944)). The case arose when the mother and child challenged the school's decision to
administer corporal punishment to the child against his mother's wishes. Id. at 296. The
court concluded that the mother's right to oppose the corporal punishment of her child
is not fundamental and that the state therefore need not show a compelling interest
before imposing that punishment. Id. at 299. Although the court acknowledged that the
Fourteenth Amendment protected "the right of parents generally to control means of
discipline of their children," it balanced that interest against the state's "countervailing
interest in the maintenance of order in the schools." Id. at 296.
63.
430 U.S. 651 (1977).
64.
Id.
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ment cases, the authority to use corporal punishment was delegated from
parent to school. Today, the Court recognized that the teacher's
authority is derived from the state's power under compulsory education
laws to administer corporal punishment '"for the proper education of the
child and for the maintenance of group discipline. "'65 The Court
weighed the state's interests in discipline and education against a child's
"right to be free from ... unjustified intrusions on personal security,"
which was part of the "historic liberties"66 protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The Court concluded that reasonable corporal punishment in school
was "justifiable" because the state had a parens patriae interest in
balancing "the child's ·interest· in personal security and the traditional
view that some limited corporal punishment may be necessary in the
course of a child's education.''67 In affirming this right of reasonable
corporal punishment in public schools under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments, the Ingraham Court left open the issues of whether the
Due Process Clause protects a fundamental, parental right of corporal
punishment, and if so, how far that right extends. Thus, the legacy of
Ingraham is that the democratic process is free to accept reasonable
corporal punishment but is not required to tolerate it.
In sum, Supreme Court cases have recognized the fundamental right
of parents to direct the upbringing of their children. This precedent does
not specifically include corporal punishment as part of that right, nor
does it define the scope of reasonable corporal punishment. Therefore,
we have to look to other sources to determine if and how corporal
punishment is part of that fundamental right. We can turn to history and
tradition and to the evolving standards of decency to consider the status
of corporal punishment as a fundamental right.

B.

History and Tradition

The Supreme Court has used history and tradition as a source for
identifying and defining fundamental rights. 68 The Court observed

65. Id. at 662 (quoting 1 FOWLER, V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW
OF TORTS § 3.20 (1956)).
66. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 673.
67. Id at 676.
68. History and tradition have replaced natural law as a source for fundamental
rights under substantive due process. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 22, at 38891; see also Ely, supra note 9, at 22-32.(discussing the historical use of natural law in
interpreting the Constitution); McCarthy, supra note 28, at 983-84 (chronicling the shift
from natural law to tradition as a source of fundamental rights).
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generally in Snyder v. Massachusetts 69 that it could establish a fundamental right by relying on "some principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. "70 More specific to our purposes, the Court has relied on history
and tradition when defining the parameters of substantive due process in
matters involving the family: "Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the. family precisely because the institution
of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."71
This appeal to history and tradition as a source of fundamental rights has
been debated by commentators72 and the Supreme Court. 73
Commentators who favor the use of history and tradition to establish
fundamental rights often advance two reasons in support of their
position. 74 First, they maintain that history and tradition enable the
Court to give fundamental rights status to interests that society has
already agreed deserve protection. 75 Over time, some principles will
be rejected while others take root. Those principles that have withstood
the test of time become traditions that reflect a societal consensus about

69.
291 U.S. 97 (1934).
70. Id. at 105.
71.
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality
opinion); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (noting that parents'
"fundamental interest" in guiding their children's religious upbringing is reflected in the
"history and culture of Western civilization")i Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (asserting that the Court should consult the
'"traditions and [collective] conscience"' of the country as a source of establishing
fundamental rights) .(quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
72.
See, e.g., Ely, supra note 9, at 39-43 (1978) (discussing the indeterminate and
undemocratic nature of tradition as a source for fundamental rights); Rebecca L. Brown,
Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177, 181-82 (1993) (defining tradition as a societal
judgment based on values and aspirations and discussing the effect that traditions have
on constitutional interpretation). But see Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981, 1043-47 (1979) (addressing Professor
Ely's criticisms of the use of history and tradition as a basis for recognizing fundamental
rights); Developments in the Law - The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1156, 1186-87 (1980) [hereinafter Developments] (discussing the value of a
tradition-based approach to establishing a fundamental right).
73.
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion); Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (plurality opinion); Moore, 431 U.S. at 494.
Developments, supra note 72, at 1186-87; see also Lupu, supra note 72, at
74.
1043-47 (discussing the "many ways in which history demonstrates recognition of a
liberty as fundamental.") Id. at 1044.
75. Developments, supra note 72, at 1186.
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what interests should be preserved. 76 For example, the principle of
family autonomy has been established over time, and thus, has become
an enduring tradition. As this tradition has taken root, people expect the
Court to protect it. Therefore, when the Court recognizes family privacy
as a fundamental right, it is simply giving constitutional protection to a
principle that history and tradition already have carved out and upon
which there is societal consensus. 77
Second, these commentators contend that history and tradition
represent neutral principles on which to ground fundamental rights. 78
The principles are neutral because the Court is consulting external
authority when it recognizes a fundamental right rather than relying on
the subjective beliefs of its members. Members of the Court can avoid
imposing their own beliefs, or legislating from the bench, when they tum
to "a relatively objective history" as a source of fundamental rights. 79
According to at least one commentator, this reliance on tradition will
check the Court's authority by ensuring that societal consensus supports
judicial recognition of a fundamental right. 80
Critics, such as Professor Ely, of using history and tradition as a basis
for fundamental rights raise two objections. 81 First, Professor Ely
points to various problems with defining a tradition. 82 Those
definitional problems include locating a tradition geographically and
temporally, deciding when something is established enough to become

76. But see Brown, supra note 72, at 182. The author rejects time as an essential
element of establishing a tradition. The author argues that she does not endorse the
more common definitions of tradition "because they presuppose that the practice at issue
has withstood the test of time. For my purposes, the longevity of a practice is not
decisive." Id.
77. See, e.g., Moore, 431 U.S. at 500•06 (noting that history and tradition protect
the extended family); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (noting that limits on substantive due process protection come from "respect
for the teachings of history [and] solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our
society") (citing Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)).
78. Developments, supra note 72, at 1187.
79. Id.
80. Id.; see also Brown, supra note 72, at 191-92 (discussing the rationale behind
the "common consent" theory). Brown explains that "evidence of longstanding acts of
government is relevant to a constitutional analysis to the extent that such evidence
suggests that those acts are legitimate because of the common consent to their
continuation." Id. at 192.
81.
Ely, supra note 9, at 39-43.
82. Id. at 39; see also Brown, supra note 72, at 181-82. Brown offers several
definitions for tradition, including: "'a continuing pattern of culture beliefs or practices,"'
along with "'a long-established or inherited way of thinking or acting' or 'the handing
down of statements, beliefs, legends, customs, information, etc., from generation to
generation."' Id. (quoting THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 2006 (2d ed. 1987)).
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a tradition, determining who defines a tradition, and figuring out what
history has to say about creating a particular tradition. 83 These
ambiguities in defining a tradition put the Court in the position of having
"to admit that tradition does not really generate an answer." 84 The
Court, therefore, must look elsewhere to determine what constitutes a
fundamental right.
.
Second, Professor Ely criticizes the "undemocratic nature" of using the
interests of past generations to establish a fundamental right today. 85
A tradition for him is something that has withstood the test of time but
may also be frozen in time. He is reluctant to have the Court establish
a right based on a tradition that may be outdated and ignore contemporary societal beliefs. 86 In addition, Professor Ely contends that judicial
reliance on tradition is undemocratic because courts will be protecting
the beliefs of the majority at the expense of minority interests. 87 . Often,
a principle becomes a tradition when there is societal consensus about
it, and that consensus is reached when a majority of people endorses the
principle. 88 When courts recognize a fundamental right in response to
the majority's beliefs,.they are abandoning their role of safeguarding the
rights of the minority who cannot secure them through the political
process and are usurping the legislature's job. 89
The Supreme Court has also debated how history and tradition should
be interpreted when considering the existence of a fundamental right. 90
Justices Scalia's and Brennan's divergent readings of history ahd
tradition in Michael H. v. Gerald D. 91 illustrate the difficulty of using
those values to identify and define a fundamental right. The debate in
Michael H. focused on competing definitions of the interest at stake. 92

83.
Ely, supra note 9, at 39-40.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 42.
86.
Id. ("The provisions for which we are trying to locate a source of values were
phrased in open-ended terms precisely to admit the possibility of growth.") (footnote
omitted).
87. Id. at 42-43.
88.
Brown, supra note 72, at 192 (explaining the "common consent" theory).
89.
Ely, supra note 9, at 42-43.
90.
See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion); Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (plurality opinion); Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
Ohio, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
·91.
Michael H., 491 U.S. 110.
92.
See generally Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential
Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1084-85
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The level of specificity with which the interest was defined determined
whether it had been historically and traditionally protected, and thus,
whether the Court should have recognized it as a fundamental right. 93
In Michael H., a plurality of the Court narrowly defined the interest at
stake when it determined that Michael H. had no substantive due process
right to a relationship with his biological daughter, Victoria. 94
Victoria's mother was married to another man, Gerald D., when the
child was conceived, and Gerald D. was listed as the child's father on
her birth certificate. 95 After Michael H. was informed that he was
Victoria's biological father and blood tests confirmed this fact, he sought
to establish his paternity and visitation rights. 96 This appeal to the

(1981) (noting that the "indeterminacy" of levels of generality is comparable to the
"arbitrariness inherent in accommodating fundamental rights with competing
government interests"); Ely, supra note 9, at 40-41 (noting the "common (and
understandable) trick of varying the relevant tradition's level of abstraction to make it
come out right") (footnote omitted).
93. In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court agreed that history and tradition
could be used to establish a fundamental right. The debate centered on what that history
means. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (plurality opinion). As in Michael H., the specificity with
which the interest was defined determined whether it traditionally had been protected.
In Bowers, the Supreme Court held that a state sodomy statute did not violate the
fundamental rights of homosexuals. Id. at 189. In the plurality opinion, Justice White
framed the interest narrowly and concluded that history and tradition did not "extend a
fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy." Id. at 192.
Justice White referred to the "ancient roots" of prohibitions against sodomy and cited
criminal laws against sodomy that dated from colonial times to the present. Id. at 19294. Based on this authority, he dismissed any claim that the right was grounded in
tradition as "at best, facetious." Id. at 194. Justice Burger, writing in concurrence,
traced back the history of prohibitions against sodomy to Roman and English law to
reach the same conclusion. Id. at 196-97 (Burger, J., concurring) ("Condemnation of
those practices is firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards.").
In dissent, however, Justice Blackmun disagreed with the level of specificity with
which the plurality framed the interest. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice
Blackmun stated that the case was not about "'a fundamental right to engage in
homosexual sodomy."' Id. (quoting plurality opinion at 191). Instead, the case was
about '"the right to be let alone."' Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
478 (1928)) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). By framing the case as a right to privacy issue,
Justice Blackmun was able to draw on Supreme Court precedents that protect the rights
of individuals to make choices about how they conduct their personal lives. Id. at 20406. In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens also took issue with the plurality's narrow
framing of the interest. Id. at 214 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that
the plurality only examined homosexual sodomy and ignored heterosexual sodomy even
though historically both kinds of sodomy were prohibited. Id. at 215. Justice Stevens'
reading of history and tradition, therefore, does not support Justice White's exclusion of
only homosexual sodomy from heightened constitutional protection. Again, differing
judicial interpretations of history and tradition point out the inconsistencies and
subjectivity of those values as sources for recognizing fundamental rights.
94. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124.
95. Id. at 113-14, 124.
96. Id. at 114.
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Supreme Court arose out of the lower courts' denial of his paternity and
visitation claims. 97
Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, rejected Michael H. 's argument
that he had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in his relationship
with his biological daughter. 98 In reaching that conclusion, Justice
Scalia asserted the need to root a fundamental right in history and
tradition. 99 Given that need, Justice Scalia considered "whether the
relationship between . . . Michael and Victoria has been treated as a
protected family unit under the historic practices of our society." 100
Justice Scalia determined that history and tradition did not protect the
relationship between an unmarried father and his illegitimate daughter, 101 but history and tradition have protected the rights of legitimate
parents and the "marital family." 102 Justice Scalia stated that Michael
H. had failed to find any historical precedent to support constitutional
protection of his relationship with his daughter:
What counts is whether the States in fact award substantive parental rights to
the natural father of a child conceived within, and born into, an extant marital
union that wishes to embrace the child. We are not aware of a single case, old
or new, that has done so. This is not the stuff of which fundamental rights . . .
are made. 103
.

Thus, he concluded that the Court would not favor the interests of
Michael H., the "adulterous natural father," over the historicallyrecognized rights of Gerald D., the "marital father.'' 104
Justice Brennan, writing in dissent, challenged the level of specificity
with which the plurality defined the interest at stake. 105 Justice

97.
Id. at 115-16.
Id. at 124.
98.
Id. at 122 ("In an attempt to limit and guide interpretation of the [Due
99.
Process] Clause, we have insisted . . . that it be an interest traditionally protected by our
society.").
Id. at 124.
100.
101. Id. at 124-25.
102.
Id. at 123-24 (noting the "historic respect-indeed, sanctity would not be too
strong a term-traditionally accorded to the relationships that develop within the unitary
family") (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
103. Id. at 127.
104. Id. at 130.
105. Id. at 139 (Brennan, J. dissenting). Justice Brennan suggested a broader
interpretation of the interest:
Today's plurality, however, does not ask whether parenthood is an interest
that historically has received our attention and protection; the answer to that
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Brennan noted that the Court had not defined the interests so specifically
in other family rights cases, such as a couple's decision to use contraceptives and an individual's right to raise his illegitimate children. 106 If
the Court had characterized the interests as narrowly in other cases, he
concluded, it would have determined that those interests had not been
protected by history and tradition, and thus, were not fundamental
rights. 107
Justice Brennan proposed that the Court instead define Michael H. 's
interest more generally as "that of a parent and child in their relationship
with each other." 108 Using that definition, he concluded that Michael
H. 's relationship with Victoria was "sufficiently substantial to qualify as
a liberty interest under our prior cases." 109 The problem with this
definition, however, is that it begs the question. Justice Brennan cannot
really determine whether parenthood has been protected historically
without defining what he means by parenthood. Justice Brennan may
have been offering a definition of parenthood when he compared
Michael H. 's interests to those of unwed, biological fathers in earlier
Supreme Court cases. 110 He read those cases as establishing a tradition
of protecting the rights of unwed fathers and concluded that Michael
H. 's situation fell within that tradition. 111
Justice Brennan discussed at length the way that the plurality read past
cases and used history and tradition to narrowly circumscribe the
parameters of a fundamental right. 112 He criticized the plurality's use
of tradition because it ignored the "malleable" and "elusive" nature of
tradition and cautioned against using tradition to place an "objective
boundary" around the Constitution.11 3 Justice Brennan further noted

question is too clear for dispute. Instead, the plurality asks whether the
specific variety of parenthood under consideration--a natural father's
relationship with a child whose mother is married to another man--has
enjoyed such protection.
Id.; see Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition
of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1085-98 (1990) (criticizing Justice Scalia's claim
that he is proposing a value-neutral approach to selecting the level of generality for
defining the fundamental right at stake in Michael H. ).
106. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 139 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 139-40.
108. Id. at 141-42. In tum, the plurality criticized this broad characterization of
the interests for giving judges "imprecise guidance" and leading to "arbitrary
decisionmaking." Id. at 128 n.6 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
109. Id. at 142 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110.
Id.
111. Id. at 142-43.
112. Id. at 137-38.
113. Id. at 137. Justice Brennan observed that, contrary to the plurality's
assertions, tradition does not place an "objective boundary" around the Constitution.
Id. The sources of our nation's traditions are varied and open to interpretation, and thus,
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that even if the Court did consult history and tradition, 114 it would find
that in past cases history and tradition have been used to protect the
rights of parents and, in particular, the rights of unwed, biological
fathers.11 5
Both Justice Brennan and Justice Scalia turned to history and tradition
in determining whether Michael H. 's interests should be constitutionally
protected, and they agreed that tradition protects the rights of fathers.
Their debate centered on whether history and tradition protect "marital
father[s]," as Justice Scalia maintained, 116 or unwed, biological fathers,
as Justice Brennan asserted. 117 Thus, their differences were not in
deciding whether to rely on history and tradition, but in :figuring out
what that history and tradition meant. 118
Courts face a similar problem of unclear history and elusive tradition
when they seek to determine whether parents have a fundamental right
to corporally punish their children. The courts agree that history and
tradition protect parents' rights to guide their children's upbringing. 119
The issues then become whether history and tradition include corporal
punishment within that right, and if so, how far the right of reasonable
corporal punishment extends.
The Supreme Court has recognized the fundamental rights of parents
to direct the upbringing of their children as part of an enduring

people can "disagree about the content [and significance] of particular traditions." Id.
Justice Brennan underscored the shifting nature of tradition by pointing out how difficult
it is to fix the starting and ending points of a tradition. Id. at 138. Therefore, the
ephemeral, subjective nature of tradition makes it an unreliable source for defining a
fundamental right.
114. Id. at 139 ("It is not that tradition has been irrelevant to our prior decisions.") .
115.
Id. at 138-39, 141-43. Justice Brennan further stated that: "It is ironic that an
approach so utterly dependent on tradition is so indifferent to our precedents." Id. at
138.
116. Id. at 130 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
117. Id. at 142 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
118.
This is the "malleable" and "elusive" nature of tradition problem that Justice
Brennan flagged. Id. at 137.
119. See Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268
U.S. 510 (1925); see also Clasen v. Pruhs, 95 N.W. 640, 645 (Neb. 1903) (Sedgwick,
J., concurring) ('"Parental discipline, rightly understood, is to assist the strivings and
aspirations of the child's better nature. And the child, needing this assistance, is
therefore entitled to it."') (quoting JOEL P. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL
LAW§ 880 (1857)); Landerv. Seaver, 76 Am. Dec. 156, 161-62 (Vt. 1859) ("This great,
and to some extent irresponsible, power of control and correction is invested in the
parent by nature and necessity.").
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American tradition, 120 but it has never stated whether that tradition
includes the parental right to administer corporal punishment. 121
Proponents of including corporal punishment in the fundamental right
will point to its long-standing use and widespread acceptance in
American society and argue that this amounts to a tradition. 122 They
will note that this tradition of allowing parents to use corporal punishment to discipline their children has taken root over the past two
centuries and can be traced back to English common law. 123 Early
American cases adopted English common-law principles and affirmed
the "power of control and correction . . . invested in the parent by
nature and necessity." 124 The tradition has deepened over time, and
today every state continues to recognize the parental ability to administer
reasonable corporal punishment. 125 These legislative enactments,

120.
See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 510; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
121.
See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,663 (1977) (noting the "historical and
contemporary approval of reasonable corporal punishment" in public schools).
122.
See id. at 660 (discussing the history of corporal punishment in the schools).
The Court noted that "[t]he use of corporal punishment in this country as a means of
disciplining schoolchildren dates back to the colonial period." Id. The Court also noted
the "background of historical and contemporary approval ofreasonable corporal punishment." Id. at 663. See also Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294, 300 (M.D.N.C.) (noting
"a settled tradition" of allowing reasonable corporal punishment in schools), ajf'd
without opinion, 423 U.S. 907 (1975); Jon M. Bylsma, Note, Hands Off! New North

Carolina General Statutes Section JJSC-390 Allows Local School Boards To Ban
Corporal Punishment, 70 N.C. L. REV. 2058, 2062 (1992) (detailing how the in loco
parentis justification for corporal punishment in schools has eroded and given way to
justifications based solely on institutional control needs).
123.
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 120 (1768) (noting that battery is legal when parents are giving moderate
correction to their children); 2 JAMES JSENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 169
(1971) (noting that parents have "a right to the exercise of such discipline, as may be
requisite for the discharge of their sacred trust") (footnote omitted); see also James
Papakirk, Comment, Michigan's New Corporal Punishment Amendment: Where the
Good Act Giveth, Did the Amendment Taketh Away?, 10 COOLEY L. REV. 383, 387
(1993) (discussing the religious and secular roots of corporal punishment and noting that
fundamentalist religious tradition accounts for much of the rationale for corporal punishment).
124.
Lander v. Seaver, 76 Am. Dec. 156, 161-62 (Vt. 1859); see also Gould v.
Christianson, 10 F. Cas. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1836) (holding that when a father places his son
on a navigational ship for the purpose of learning the trade, the ship master may inflict
corporal punishment on that minor); Vanvactor v. State, 15 N.E. 341 (Ind. 1888)
(holding that a teacher may rightfully apply corporal punishment and that the whipping
of a child did not constitute assault and battery per se); Rowe v. Rugg, 91 N.W. 903
(Iowa 1902) (holding that a mother has the same right as a father to discipline a child);
Small v. Morrison, 118 S.E. 12 (N.C. 1923) (explaining that an unemancipated child
cannot bring a tort action against parents).
E.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-24 (1982); ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.430 (1989);
125.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-403 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-605 {Michie 1987);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-703 (West 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-18
(West 1986 & Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 468 (1987); GA. CODE ANN.
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judicial decisions, and secondary authority126 can be interpreted to
mean that history has endorsed a parental right of corporal punishment.127 Therefore, one can conclude that the parental right to use
corporal punishment is "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental." 128
Opponents of including corporal punishment as a fundamental right
will challenge this reading of history. They might acknowledge that a
practice of allowing parents to corporally punish their children has

§ 16-3-20(3) (Harrison 1988); HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-309 (1985 & Supp. 1993); IND.
CODE ANN.§ 31-6-4-3(e) (Burns 1987 & Supp. 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 503.110
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:18(4) (West 1986 & Supp.
1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 106 (West 1964); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW
§ 4-501(2) (1991 & Supp. 1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.136b(6) (West 1993);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.379 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.061
(Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 45-3-107 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-1413 (1943); NEV. REV. STAT. § 15-200.508 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 627:6 (1986 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 35.10 (McKinney 1993); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 110-101.1 (Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-05 (1985); Omo REV.
CODE ANN. § 2919.22 (Anderson 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 844 (West 1993);
OR. REV. STAT.§ 161.205 (1992); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 509 (1993); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-7-490 (Law. Co-op. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-18-5 (1993);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.61 (West 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-401 (1953);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.015 (West 1993); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.45 (West
1993); see, e.g., People v. Whitehurst, 9 Cal. App. 4th 1045, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1992); Howard v. Florida Dep 't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 589 So.
2d 1018 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Peters, 780 P.2d 602 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989);
People v. Ball, 317 N.E.2d 54 (Ill. 1974); State v. Bell, 223 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1974);
State v. Carmichael, 727 P.2d 918 (Kan. 1986); Custody of a Minor, 393 N.E.2d 836
(Mass. 1979); Natural Mother v. Hinds County Welfare Dep't, 579 So. 2d 1269 (Miss.
1991); Mancinelli v. Crosby, 589 A.2d 664 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); State v.
Osbourne, 808 P.2d 624 (N.M. 1991); State v. Thorpe, 429 A.2d 785 (R.I. 1981);
Marlar v. Bill, 178 S.W.2d 634 (Tenn. 1944); Gerety v. Gerety, 306 A.2d 693 (Vt.
1973); Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 44 S.E.2d 419 (Va. 1947); Smith v. West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ., 295 S.E.2d 680 (W. Va. 1982); Keser v. State, 706 P.2d 263 (Wyo.
1985).
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08 (1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
126.
TORTS § 147(1) (1965).
127.
In Baker v. Owen, the court noted that the parental interests protected in
Meyer, Pierce, and Prince were rooted in history and contrasted those interests with the
paren_t's objections to the use of corporal punishment in the instant case. Baker v.
Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294, 300 (M.D.N.C.), aff'd without opinion, 423 U.S. 907 (1975).
The court stated that history did not support the parent's opposition to corporal
punishment and further observed that such opposition "bucks a settled tradition of
countenancing such punishment when reasonable." Id. (citations omitted). The court
also stated, however, that the issue of corporal punishment was "unsettled and probably
incapable of categorical resolution." Id. (citations omitted).
128.
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (citations omitted).
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developed over time, but they will assert that the tradition is under attack
today. Those attacks have taken the form of heightened restrictions on
parents who use corporal punishment 129 and the banning of corporal
punishment in other contexts, such as in public schools, 130 in prisons, 131 and in the foster care system. 132 Furthermore, children have
no ability to shape the history and tradition from which such a right
would emerge. These changes in corporal punishment laws and the
exclusion of children's voices from the process of establishing a right
suggest that a societal consensus no longer exists on the use of corporal
punishment. If traditions are based on the long-standing practices agreed
to by a majority of the community and that agreement erodes, then the
foundation for the tradition also crumbles.
It may be dangerous, therefore, to create a right based on a tradition
when that tradition can disappear. If the tradition no longer exists, then
the danger is that the right will also become extinct. Society used to be
more tolerant of corporal punishment than it is today. 133 The erosion
of support for corporal punishment reflects the "malleable" and "elusive"
nature of using tradition in establishing fundamental rights. 134 A right
should not be vulnerable to social whims, and its viability should not
depend on whether a tradition has become outdated. The Court
recognizes an interest as a fundamental right in order to protect the right
when it comes under attack. The Court has never relied on historical
consensus to contract the scope of a fundamental right; it has only turned
to history and tradition to expand a right. Given the decreasing
acceptance of corporal punishment, the Court should not use history and
tradition to establish a right that may soon have to be contracted. In

129. Spare the Rod? Mother Arrested for Slapping Child, supra note 2, at 7
(discussing a mother's arrest for slapping her nine-year-old son across the face in a
grocery store).
130. NATIONAL COALITION TO ABOLISH CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN SCHOOLS,
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT FACT SHEET 1 (1993) [hereinafter FACT SHEET] (noting that in
the past 20 years, the number of states abolishing corporal punishment in schools has
increased from 1 to 26); see also Nadine Block & Robert Fatham, Convincing State
Legislatures to Ban Corporal Punishment, 9 CmLDREN'S LEGAL RTS. J. 21, 23 (1988)
(noting that 30 of the 38 largest metropolitan areas do not allow the use of corporal
punishment in their schools); Bylsma, supra note 122, at 2059 (arguing that a trend
toward statutory bans on the use of corporal punishment has emerged and thus has
broken the tradition of allowing corporal punishment in public schools).
131. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 730, para. 5/3-8-7(b)(l) (Smith-Hurd 1993).
132. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 1531.5(d) (West 1993).
133. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 660 (1977) ("The use of corporal
punishment in this country as a means of disciplining school children dates back to the
colonial period."). But see FACT SHEET, supra note 130, at 1 (noting that the
contemporary trend is to eliminate the use of corporal punishment in schools).
134. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 137 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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effect, when the right does not need protection, tradition ensures it.
Once the right is under majoritarian attack and needs protection, history
and tradition cannot provide it. Thus, the Court would be on firmer
ground if it relied on some value other than history and tradition to
establish a fundamental right of corporal punishment.
C.

"Evolving Standards of Decency"

Another possible source considered in establishing fundamental rights
is the "contemporary values" 135 or "evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society." 136 The Supreme Court
acknowledged the role of societal values in interpreting the Due Process
Clause: "[D]ue process is not measured by the yardstick of personal
reaction . . . but by that whole community sense of 'decency and
fairness' that has been woven by common experience into the fabric of
acceptable conduct. It is on this bedrock that this Court has established
the concept of due process." 137 The premise underlying the evolving
standards of decency theory is that judges should use the values that
modem society wants to protect as the basis for identifying fundamental
rights. 138 Once those values have developed to the point where they

135. Lupu, supra note 72, at 1047; see also Terrance R. Sandalow, Judicial
Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1186 (1977) ("[C]onstitutional law
is to be understood as expressing contemporary societal nonns.").
136. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
137. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432,436 (1957). The Supreme Court has used
this standard when deciding if the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause had been violated. In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), the Court struck
down a prisoner's claim that arose when a physician failed to order additional tests to
detennine what was causing the prisoner's back problems. Id. at 107. The Court found
that this failure to diagnose and treat did not amount to "deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs," which was required to violate the evolving standards of decency
under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 106. In reaching this conclusion, the Court cited
a line of Eighth Amendment cases in which it held unconstitutional "punishments which
are incompatible with 'the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society."' Id. at 102 (citations omitted) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
101 (1958)). Thus, the Court indicated its willingness to look to contemporary values
to assess the constitutionality of a practice under the Eighth Amendment, but it did not
further explain how it would identify and define those evolving standards. More
recently, the Court observed that "contemporary standards of decency always are
violated" when prison officials use excessive force on prisoners. Hudson v. McMillan,
503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992).
138. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial
Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 320 (1993) (explaining
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have become part of the social fabric, the Court should protect them as
fundamental rights under the Due Process Clause. 139 In this way, the
Supreme Court will be interpreting the Constitution to reflect societal
changes and contemporary norms.
The use of evolving standards of decency as the basis for recognizing
fundamental rights raises a host of issues. The majority of those issues
focuses on defining the standard. First, the standard assumes the
existence of uniform beliefs about what values should be protected. 140
This standard, however, fails to acknowledge that our pluralistic society
may mean that people who have different religious, ethnic, and socioeconomic backgrounds do not share the same beliefs. 141 Without these
shared beliefs, people may not agree on what the evolving standards of
decency are. These cultural differences among people and groups may
be compounded by geographic differences when community norms vary
among regions, states, and localities. 142 The shifting meaning of
community norms may make it impossible to reach any consensus about
which contemporary values deserve constitutional protection.
A second, related issue focuses on determining the point in time that
a societal belief forms the basis of a constitutional right. The dangers
of fixing a point in time arise at both ends of the spectrum. 143 At one

that the Supreme Court might base substantive due process protection on "[its] sense of
which of the eligible explanatory rationales best accords with moral intuitions or
principles that it takes to be widely shared in the society at large"). But see Ely, supra
note 9, at 52 (concluding that judicial reference to societal norms in establishing a
fundamental right merely disguises the judge's reliance on his or her own values).
139. See Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double
Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 284 (1973) ("The Court's
task is to ascertain the weight of the principle in conventional morality and to convert
the moral principle into a legal one by connecting it with the body of constitutional
law.").
140. Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 436.
141. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713, 172223 (1988) (discussing the danger of ignoring the differences among American
subcultures).
142. See Ely, supra note 9, at 46; Lupu, supra note 72, at 1047 (observing that
"social consensus is difficult to measure, especially on a nationwide basis"); Michael J.
Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of
Substantive Due Process, 23 UCLA L. REV. 689, 732 n.201 (1976) (noting that "the
problem of national versus local standards is an important and complex one with subtle
implications" and advocating the use of a national standard when determining
contemporary values).
143. See Ely, supra note 9, at 39 (discussing the difficulty of identifying the
relevant time frame when tradition provides a source of a fundamental right); Lupu,
supra note 72, at 1045 (responding to Professor Ely's concerns about pinpointing the
relevant historical time frame and noting that "[t]he length of historical support required
to support the claim might vary with the intensity with which it is held, but, in any
event, no less than a generation of special respect ought to suffice").

26

[VOL. 32: 1, 1995]

Parental Corporal Punishment
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

end, the concern is that the evolving standards of decency will enable
the Court to base a fundamental right on a passing trend. When the
trend has faded, the right will remain, but it will have no foundation. At
the other end, the risk in waiting too long to recognize a right is that the
evolving standards of decency will become indistinguishable from using
tradition as a source of fundamental rights.
The Supreme Court has indicated, in at least one opinion, that the
evolving standards of decency should form a "bedrock" for establishing
a fundamental right. 144 That language suggests that a right will only
be recognized after the societal norm has been firmly established. If this
is the requirement, there will be no difference between basing a
fundamental right on the evolving standards of decency and grounding
it in tradition. Currently, the only difference between the two sources
of a right is that tradition requires the consensus to have lasted longer
than is required under the evolving standards of decency. 145 A
tradition is a practice or belief that has withstood the test of time, while
the evolving standards of decency include more recent, contemporary
values. The challenge involved with using the evolving standards of
decency is figuring out whether and how the law should change to
reflect changing societal standards. People's perspectives, and thus
societal standards, may change, but the law might not be able to
implement these new perspectives and standards--perhaps because of a
breakdown in the democratic process. When the Court blurs the sole
distinction between the two sources, it undermines any advantage that
the evolving standards of decency may offer and opens that standard up
to the same criticisms pressed against tradition and consensus. 146 The
challenge then is to determine when a value is established long enough
to be recognized as an evolving standard of decency but not so long that
it is in effect a tradition.
The last major issue is determining the Court's role in defining the
evolving standards of decency. Some commentators, such as Professor
Ely, maintain that legislatures are better equipped than the Court to

144. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436 (1957). One commentator questions
whether a consensus even existed in that case given the fact that it was a split decision,
with three Justices dissenting. See Ely, supra note 9, at 45-46.
145. My colleague, Randy Lee, offered helpful insights into this distinction.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 81-89.
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determine what contemporary values are. 147
In Professor Ely's
opinion, the legislature is the more democratic body because the public
elects its members, and thus, is in a better position than the judiciary to
ascertain society's "genuine values." 148 Professor Ely concludes his
criticisms of the Court's use of the evolving standards of decency by
noting that this approach represents nothing "more than a conscious or
unconscious cover for the judge's own values." 149 Other commentators
take issue with this position and note that courts are "admirably situated
to observe and to sense the evolution of contemporary moral culture."150 One commentator has observed that the legislature's expertise
in shaping economic and social policy does not extend to defining "the
public morals." 151 He notes that the legislature is equipped to respond
only to established social conventions but that the Court "is ordained by
tradition to serve as a forum for the subtle dialectical interplay of
complex, principled ethical discourse." 152 Thus, the Court's role in
determining what constitutes the evolving standards of decency is
unsettled.
These three concerns should be addressed when the issues involve the
existence and scope of a fundamental, parental right to administer
corporal punishment. The questions are whether the evolving standards
of decency can establish this fundamental right and, if so, whether they
define the parameters of the right.

147. See Ely, supra note 9, at 49-52 ("[A]s between courts and legislatures, it is
clear the latter are better situated to reflect consensus."). Professor Ely argues that the
legislature is better able to identify societal values than members of the judiciary, whom
he labels the "nondemocratic elite." Id. at 51; see also Lupu, supra note 72, at 1047
(agreeing with "Professor Ely's observation that the opinions of lawyers, judges, and
'experts' alone are insufficient" to determine social consensus). But see Perry, supra
note 142, at 729 (observing that "the Supreme Court ... [is] quite competent to measure
the metes and bounds of the public morals" and concluding that the Court "need not be
paralyzed by self-doubt about its institutional ability to determine accurately the contours
of the public morals"); H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: A THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 189-90 (1993) (criticizing Ely's
theory because it fails to recognize that the courts, by identifying the "defects" in the
constitutional system, must make "substantive moral and political choices") (citing
Bruce Ackerman's theory endorsing judicial involvement with substantive moral and
political choices stated in Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carotene Products, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 713 (1985)).
148. Ely, supra note 9, at 51.
149. Id. at 52; see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 63-69 (1980). Professor Ely noted that even if consensus can be
reached, "consensus is not reliably discoverable, at least not by courts." Id. at 64.
150. Perry, supra note 142, at 729; see also BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, I WE THE
PEOPLE 6-7 (1991) (arguing that judicial opinions are legitimate implementations of the
moral-political choices that the people have made).
151. Perry, supra note 142, at 729.
152. Id.
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The main obstacle to using the evolving standards of decency to
establish a fundamental right of corporal punishment is reaching a
consensus about societal attitudes toward corporal punishment. 153
People's attitudes about corporal punishment may vary based on age,
race, religion, socio-economic status, or geographic location. 154
Certainly, they may vary depending on one's status as a parent or a
child, and the perspectives of children-who are the people most
affected by this issue-have not been taken into account in the current
debate. Therefore, there may be no "common experience" on which to
build a "community sense" that parental use of corporal punishment
deserves heightened constitutional protection. 155 Without that consensus, a right does not exist. 156
Moreover, it is impossible to fix a point in time where the evolving
standards of decency either clearly endorse or reject parental corporal
punishment as a fundamental right. On one hand, there are signs that
the standard is evolving away from recognition of the right, but the issue
is unresolved. For example, some states have banned the use of corporal
punishment on children in foster care 157 and in public schools. 158 On
the other hand, there are indications that parental corporal punishment
is recognized as a fundamental right. Every state has conferred on
parents, through judicial decisions or legislative enactments, the right to
use reasonable corporal punishment. 159 These mixed signals indicate
that neither the existence nor the absence of a right of parental corporal
punishment can be fixed at a certain point in time. Because no
153.
The Supreme Court discussed conflicting attitudes about corporal punishment
in the schools and noted that "[p]rofessional and public opinion is sharply divided on the
practice." Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 660 (1977); see also Papakirk, supra note
123, at 388 (discussing the disagreements among social scientists about the effectiveness
of corporal punishment).
See, e.g., Maria Newman, Raising Children Right Isn't Always Enough, N.Y.
154.
TIMES, Dec. 22, 1991, § 4, at 12 ("Immigrant families, in particular, feel caught in a trap
laid by shifting American standards for punishment. Disciplining older children in ways
that were once acceptable and are still used back home-welt-raising spankings with
belts or paddles, for example----may mean a teacher or welfare worker opening a child
abuse investigation.").
155.
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
See supra text accompanying notes 129-30, 132-33.
156.
See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN.§ 234.40 (West 1993); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
157.
CODE § 1531.5(d) (West 1993).
158.
The number of states banning corporal punishment in public schools has
grown from one in the early 1970s to 26 today. See FACT SHEET, supra note 130, at 1.
159.
See supra note 125.
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consensus exists, courts should leave the democratic process alone to
protect the parental interest.
Finally, this lack of legislative consensus leaves courts with the task
of ascertaining contemporary beliefs about the status of corporal
punishment. As noted earlier, the problem with leaving this task to the
courts is that judges might be tempted to impose their own beliefs about
corporal punishment on society. 160 Thus, the evolving standards would
not reflect the public's view about corporal punishment; they would
represent the viewpoint of the "nondemocratic elite." 161
In sum, the evolving standards of decency are too unsettled to
establish the existence of a fundamental right to corporal punishment.
Although the parental right to direct the upbringing of one's children is
well-settled, there is no contemporary, societal consensus about whether
that right includes parental use of corporal punishment or what
constitutes reasonable corporal punishment. Similarly, tradition provides
no consensus about the existence of a fundamental right to use corporal
punishment and about how to balance parents' and children's interests
in determining the parameters of reasonable corporal punishment. The
"elusive" and "malleable" nature of basing a right on tradition and the
wide range of contemporary values are shaky foundations on which to
build a fundamental right. 162 Thus, one must look elsewhere for a
parental right of corporal punishment.

D.

The Political Process

Another place to look would be to the political process. Using the
political process, society would tum to legislatures to recognize and
define parents' rights to corporally punish their children. At least one
commentator has recommended. that legislatures, not the courts, are in
the best position to reflect societal consensus about what constitutes a
fundamental right. 163 When the parental right to corporally punish
one's children is at issue, society should rely on the legislative process,
and not look to the judiciary to establish such a right.
The :first argument in favor of using the legislature to determine the
status of a parent's right to use corporal punishment is that the political
process has already addressed and resolved this issue. Every state
recognizes parents' ability to administer reasonable corporal punishment,
and states have given parents broad discretion to determine what is

160.
161.
162.
163.
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See Ely, supra note 9, at 44-45; ELY, supra note 149, at 67-69.
See Ely, supra note 9, at 51.
See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
See Ely, supra note 9, at 49-51.
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reasonable. 164 The legislatures may not have clarified the parameters
of reasonable corporal punishment, but they have sufficiently secured the
parental interest so that the Court need not further protect it by
establishing fundamental, parental right of corporal punishment.
In response to this argument, one should not assume that a right which
has not been threatened in the past will not be threatened in the future.
When the issue is before the Court, the iinterest is clearly being
threatened. Therefore, the judiciary is needed to safeguard the right by
giving it fundamental status. 165 However, the second argument in
favor of leaving the issue to the political process may allay these
concerns about the parental interest in corporal punishment being
threatened.
The second argument is that the right to vote gives parents a way to
protect themselvesfrom these threats against their ability to use corporal
punishment. Unlike children who are too young to have a voice in the
political process, parents usually are adults who are old enough to vote.
Parents who believe that the laws unfairly restrict their right to discipline
their children can vote to change them. Other laws might not generate
as much interest or debate as corporal punishment laws because they are
far removed from the public's every day concerns. In contrast, the
extent of the parental right to discipline children is a matter that directly
affects how many people conduct their daily lives. Because corporal
punishment is an issue that people feel strongly about, 166 parents who
believe that the laws are unduly burdensome can try to mobilize public
opinion against them. 167 If those parents are unable to generate
support for their position, then the laws should stand. If, however,
people agree that the corporal punishment laws infringe too greatly on

a

164. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
165. See ACKERMAN, supra note 150, at 6-7.
166. The area of parent-child relations has received a great deal of public attention.
For example, the discussion about "family values" during the 1992 presidential election
symbolizes its emergence on the national agenda.
167. The usual difficulty with relying on this approach to establish a right is that
it makes the existence of a right dependent on an expression of societal consensus.
Under this approach, if a person or group cannot find a majority of people to agree with
them, then they do not have a right. This typically presents a problem for people
seeking to exercise rights such as abortion or certain kinds of speech. They are unable
to form a societal consensus because of the nature of the right. The right of parental
corporal punishment is different, however, because those who would exercise it are
likely able to form a political consensus about its existence. This consensus is reflected
in the legislative process which has traditionally been receptive to the right.
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parents' rights, then those laws should be struck down or changed to
comport with societal expectations. 168 Parents can thus ensure that the
legislature will safeguard their right, as long as it reflects societal
consensus, and need not tum to the courts to preserve this right.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court should not identify a fundamental,
parental right of corporal punishment for several reasons. First, no basis
for recognizing such a right can be found in Supreme Court precedent,
by looking to history and tradition, or by considering the evolving
standards of decency. Although these sources do not explicitly reject
fundamental rights status for parental use of corporal punishment, they
are at best ambivalent about the nature of this parental interest, and thus,
provide no consensus on which to ground a fundamental right. Second,
a decision not to recognize a fundamental right of parents to administer,
corporal punishment seeks to safeguard children's right to autonomy.
Children have a liberty interest in their own bodily integrity; there is a
better chance of preserving this interest if the fundamental right of
parents to direct their children's upbringing does not include the right to
exert physical force. Third, the legislature is better able than the Court
to ascertain the public's views on the use of corporal punishment and
can draft laws that reflect the level of protection that society wants to
give to parents who administer it. Because this majoritarian process
adequately protects parents' ability to administer corporal punishment,
there is no need for the Supreme Court to recognize a fundamental right.
Although the legislature is equipped to give parents the authority to
administer reasonable corporal punishment based on a general consensus, 169 there are certain things that should be protected from
majoritarian regulation. This is so because the legislature responds to
the majority, but the courts safeguard the interests of the minority.
Therefore, the courts should determine the scope of the reasonableness
standard. Once the legislature has established a general consensus in
favor of reasonable parental corporal punishment, courts can impose
limits on the parental use of force as a way of securing the interests of
the minority-children.

168. But see Ely, supra note 9, at 43-45 (discussing the disadvantages of basing
a right on a majoritarian consensus).
169. As noted earlier, the problem of children not having a voice in the political
process in which rights are established is a flaw in using history and the evolving
standards of decency to determine the existence of a fundamental right of parental
corporal punishment. Children are among the groups whose interests are prone to be
ignored in analyzing the presence of a consensus. Therefore, they are precisely the kind
of isolated people that rights are designed to protect. See supra text accompanying notes
153-68.
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III.

THE SCOPE OF REASONABLE CORPORAL PUNISHMENT
A.

The Current Test

Even if the political process chooses to permit parents to administer
reasonable corporal punishment, courts still struggle to define the
parameters of that reasonableness standard. The line between reasonable
and excessive force has proved difficult to draw, and courts have been
content to sketch the contours, but not the details, of how that line
should be drawn. 170 Although the current test for reasonableness may
vary slightly among states, courts consistently rely on certain criteria to
determine the reasonableness of the force. 171 The courts may not
actually articulate these criteria, but they consider three factors: parental
intent in administering the corporal punishment, the nature of the
corporal punishment, and the circumstances surrounding the punish-

170. Both tradition and the evolving standards of decency support the distinction
between reasonable and excessive corporal punishment. Although ambiguity surrounds
what constitutes reasonable corporal punishment, no such ambiguity surrounds what
constitutes excessive punishment. The relevant cases respect parental autonomy in
making child-rearing decisions, but they do not give parents unlimited authority. See,
e.g., State v. Thorpe, 429 A.2d 785, 788 (R.I. 1985) ("[T]he clear weight of authority
holds that a parent is subject to criminal liability when he/she inflicts excessive corporal
punishment."). If the parents use excessive force, then the state will intervene to protect
the welfare of the child. See Johnson v. State, 36 Am. Dec. 322 (Tenn. 1837) ("It is not
. . . the infliction of punishment, but the excess which constitutes the offense . . . .
[W]hat this excess shall be, is not a conclusion of law, but a question of fact for the
determination of the jury."). Thus, the historical tradition has been to respect the right
of parents to use force on their children but to limit the scope of the right to the use of
reasonable force. Similarly, the evolving standards of decency, as reflected in recent
legislative enactments and judicial decisions, indicate that a distinction exists between
reasonable and excessive corporal punishment, but they do not suggest where that line
should be drawn. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-18 (West 1986 & Supp.
1993) (suggesting the use of physical force upon another person is justifiable when it is
inflicted reasonably).
171. Courts have evaluated the reasonableness of the force under these criteria in
both civil and criminal actions. See In re Rodney C., 398 N.Y.S.2d 511, 515 (N.Y.
Fam. Ct. 1977) (citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 147(1) standard for
reasonableness when determining that a parent's corporal punishment of his child was
unreasonable); State v. 'Singleton, 705 P.2d 825, 826-27 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985)
(evaluating the reasonableness of the parent's corporal punishment under a totality of the
circumstances standard in a criminal action).
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ment. 172
First, parents can use physical force against their children if they
intend to control, train, or educate the children through the use of such
force. 173 The parental use of force must be designed to preserve
discipline or teach children and not to express anger or frustration
toward them. 174 If the force is not motivated by legitimate reasons,
then courts will not look to the remaining factors and balance them. 175
Second, the nature of the force used is relevant to deciding its reasonableness. The number of times the child is struck, the instrument used,
and the location and severity of the child's injuries all help to determine
whether the corporal punishment is excessive or reasonable. 176 Courts
have considered these factors in the context of individual cases when
evaluating the reasonableness of the force and have not attempted to
draw bright lines about the level of force required to make the parental
conduct unreasonable. 177 Finally, the circumstances surrounding the
corporal punishment include such factors as the child's age and
developmental level, the reason that the child is being punished, and the
availability of other less severe means of discipline. 178 These factors
give courts a framework for evaluating the reasonableness of the parental
use of corporal punishment.

I

172.
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08 (1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 147(1) (1965).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 147(1) (1965) ("A parent is privileged
173.
to apply such reasonable force ... upon his child as he reasonably believes to be
necessary for its proper control, training, or education.''); see also MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 3.08 (1985) ("The use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable if:
... (a) the force is used for the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the
minor, including the prevention or punishment of his misconduct[.]").
174. In re Rodney C., 398 N.Y.S.2d at 514-15 (distinguishing force applied for the
"'proper training or education of the child or for the preservation of discipline"' from
force '"administered for the gratification of passion or rage."') (citations omitted); see
also State v. Hunt, 406 P.2d 208, 222 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965) (commenting that corporal
punishment becomes unreasonable when a "parent ceases to act in good faith and with
parental affection, and acts immoderately, cruelly or mercilessly, with a malicious desire
to inflict pain") (citations omitted); Gillett v. Gillett, 168 Cal. App. 2d 102, 104, 335
P.2d 736, 737 (1959) (noting that a parent "may administer reasonable punishment with
impunity, but when he exceeds that limit and does so willfully he commits a battery and
is civilly liable for the consequences").
In re Rodney C., 398 N.Y.S.2d at 515 (stating that the use of force is only
175.
permitted in those circumstances).
176. See, e.g., id. (discussing the "means of punishment," which included the
severity of injury and the number of marks on the child among other factors, as relevant
to determining the reasonableness of the parents' conduct).
177.
For a discussion of how the courts have tried to draw the line between
reasonable and excessive force, see State v. Thorpe, 429 A.2d 785 (R.I. 1985).
178. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662 (1977); Harbaugh v. Commonwealth, 167 S.E.2d 329, 332 (Va. 1969); State v. Singleton, 705 P.2d 825, 827 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 150 (1965).
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A consensus may exist about the parameters of what constitutes
reasonable corporal punishment at the extreme ends of the spectrum-when it is clearly reasonable or clearly excessive. 179 For
example, most people would agree that if a child is throwing a temper
tantrum in a public place, a parent is using reasonable force when she
picks the child up and carries him away. Similarly, there is general
agreement that a prolonged beating of a child resulting in permanent
injuries to the child constitutes excessive force. The problem then is not
in reaching an agreement about the broad parameters of the right at the
extreme ends of the spectrum but in finding a consensus about the
details of the right in the gray, middle area. In searching for consensus
in that middle area, courts must balance two sets of historically protected
rights: parents' rights to corporal punishment and children's substantive
due process interests. 180
Children have a long-standing liberty interest in bodily integrity which
must be weighed against the parental right to discipline through corporal
punishment. 181 This interest has its roots in century-old precedent in
which the Supreme Court upheld the "right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others." 182 When the Court discussed this interest in
the context of corporal punishment of children in schools, it noted that
179. A line between clearly reasonable and clearly excessive force has been drawn
by legislatures and courts. See supra note 125.
180. The issue of the existence of constitutional rights for children was unsettled
at one point in American history. Although the extent of some of those rights may still
be debated, it is well-settled that children are separate legal entities from their parents.
See Developments, supra note 72, at 1358. For a historical perspective on the rights of
children as separate entities and the manner the Supreme Court has expanded or curtailed
these rights, see SAMUEL M. DAVIS & MORTIMER D. SCHWARTZ, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
AND THE LAW (1987).
181. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 673 (noting children's substantive due process
interest in "be[ing] free from ... unjustified intrusions on personal security"); see also
Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294, 301 (M.D.N.C.), aff'd without opinion, 423 U.S. 907
(1975). In Baker, the court upheld a student's right to minimal procedural due process
before corporal punishment is inflicted on him in school. The court further noted that
the child "does have an interest, protected by the concept of liberty in the Fourteenth
Amendment, in avoiding corporal punishment. . . . We believe that the concept must
include, in appropriate instances, personal security in the seemingly small things of life
as well as in the obviously momentous." Id.
182. Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891); see also Cynthia
Deneholz Sweeney, Comment, Corporal Punishment in Public Schools: A Violation of
Substantive Due Process?, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1274 (1982) (discussing the
individual's right to bodily security as part of the right to privacy).
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the right had been read to. include "freedom from bodily restraint and
punishment." 183 The right of bodily integrity, like all constitutional
rights of children, however, is not identical to an adult's right, nor is it
absolute. 184 The Court has explained in other situations why it
considers children's rights to be different from adults' rights. 185 The
relevant reason applicable to the corporal punishment context is the need
to respect the "parental role in child rearing." 186 Two important
interests are therefore at stake in these cases, and courts are left to
determine how to strike the appropriate balance between them.
The current test is deficient in balancing these interests in two
respects. First, this test produces no consensus about where the line
between reasonable and excessive force should be drawn. Individual
decisionmakers will determine the scope of the parental right and will
reach different conclusions about its parameters. The arbitrariness of
their line-drawing leaves parents and the rest of society with little
guidance about what level of force is appropriate. 187 This is particularly troublesome because parents must raise their children on a daily basis,
and therefore, must know the parameters within which they are working.
Although the parameters of other fundamental rights, such as speech,
also may be unresolved, the parental right of corporal punishment differs
from those other areas in an important way. In the other areas, people
can choose to take the risk of ambiguity, but parents need to know the
exact scope of their right before acting.
Second, even if courts can agree on where the line between reasonable
and excessive force should be drawn, that consensus represents the
consensus of people in power: parents. Adults determine the parameters
of the right, and many of those adults are parents who may be acting out
of self-interest when they de:fu;e the right. This test allows courts to

183.
Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 674 (citation omitted).
184.
See Developments, supra note 72, at 1358.
185.
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (discussing the constitutionality
of a statute restricting minors' access to abortions); see also DAVIS & ScHWARTZ, supra
note 180, at 201 (stating that in some areas, the law accords a "measure of autonomy
to children;" but in other areas, such as torts, the law "grants a measure of autonomy"
to the parents because of the inherent conflict between the desire to give children greater
control over their lives and the need to protect them from their surroundings).
186.
Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634. The other reasons advanced were the "peculiar
vulnerability" of children and their diminished decisionmaking capacity. Id.
187.
But see State v. Singleton, 705 P.2d 825, 827 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (stating
that the test for reasonableness of corporal punishment was not based on the subjective
intent of the parent to discipline the child but was based objectively on all of the
circumstances); Joan L. Neisser, School Officials: Parents or Protectors? The
Contribution of a Feminist Perspective, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1507, 1523 (1993) ("[A]n
educator is held to an objective standard of care-whether a reasonable person would
have considered the punishment appropriate.").
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ignore the voices of children, a politically isolated minority, whose
interests are strongly implicated in the definition of reasonable corporal
punishment. In balancing the interests of parent and child under the
current test, courts are free to disregard the interests of those most in
need of their protection: children.

B.

The Proposed Test

In response to these flaws in the current test, courts should consider
adopting a new test to determine the scope of reasonable parental
corporal punishment. Courts should ask parents a series of five
questions to evaluate the reasonableness of their conduct. The five
questions direct the parents to review their decision to use corporal
punishment. They ask: (1) What was your intent in administering the
corporal punishment? (2) To what were you responding? (3) What did
you do? (4) Could the corporal punishment have worked? (5) Did you
have any alternatives?
This proposed test incorporates some elements of the current standard,
but it refines those elements and introduces new ones. Like the current
approach, this test looks at the parents' intent in administering the
corporal punishment and the nature of the parents' conduct, but the
similarities end there. This new test imposes heavier burdens on parents
in assessing their intent and conduct than the criteria of the current test.
For example, the Model Penal Code, the current standard that has been
codified by many states, sets broad parameters to determine the
reasonableness of the corporal punishinent. 188 Under that standard, the
use of force is reasonable if two requirements are met. First, the
purpose of the force must be to "safeguard[] or promot[e] the welfare of
the minor, including the prevention or punishment of his misconduct."189 Second, the force is reasonable if it is not "designed to cause
or known to create a substantial risk of causing death, serious bodily
harm, disfigurement, extreme pain or mental distress or gross degradation."190 This test does not give judges much deference: it may not be
that judges cannot be sensitive to children, but that this standard will not

188.
MODEL PENAL CODE§ 3.08 (1985); see, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT.§ 703-309
(Supp. 1993); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 509 (1983).
189. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 3.08(1)(a) (1985).
190. Id. § 3.08(1)(b).
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allow them to be sensitive. In contrast, the new test does not tie the
judge's hands against the child. Furthermore, the proposed standard
includes three new elements that courts must consider: the situation that
provoked the parental use of force; the availability of alternatives other
than the use of force; and the effectiveness of the use of force.
The main advantage of this new test is its heightened sensitivity to the
interests of children. This new test acknowledges that children's
interests were not well-served in the recognition of a parental right to
corporal punishment----especially a right that allows anything short of
serious bodily injury. Standards such as the Model Penal Code are
adopted by state legislatures even though they are adverse to children's
interests because parents control the political process which establishes
their right of corporal punishment. The only remaining way to preserve
children's interests is to give them a voice in defining the scope of that
right. The current test does not guarantee children that voice because it
gives courts the latitude to define the right in ways that ignore children's
interests and consider only the parents' rights. Although the new test
has some subjectivity, it does not obstruct the judge from seeking to
protect children from excessive corporal punishment. Therefore, this
proposed test still balances the interests of parents and children, but it
resolves them in favor of children's interests.
Under the proposed test, courts must scrutinize every aspect of the
parents' decision to use corporal punishment before approving it. The
test imposes certain limits on parental force, and exceeding those limits
automatically invalidates the use of corporal punishment. To take an
extreme example, a parent cannot discipline or educate a child by
electrocuting him under any circumstances. In that situation, a court
does not need to consider the nature of the punishment in light of any
of the other factors, including the parent's intent, the circumstances
leading up to the electrocution, the effectiveness of the force, and any
alternatives to electrocution. Because the factors are interrelated,
however, courts will balance them in other situations to determine the
reasonableness of the force. For example, the intensity of the force
permitted might vary depending on the severity of the situation: a parent
can use more force on a child who traps a sibling in the laundry chute
than on a child who disobeys a parent and plays outside in the mud.
Thus, courts have a certain amount of discretion in determining what
constitutes reasonable corporal punishment, but in exercising that
discretion, they must first and foremost consider children's interests.
The first question in the new test, which requires courts to consider
the parents' intent in administering corporal punishment, is similar but
not identical to the current approach. The subtle but significant
difference between the approaches highlights the proposed standard's
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increased sensitivity to the interests of children. Under the current
approach, many states have codified the Model Penal Code test for
intent. 191 This test provides that corporal punishment is justified if a
parent is acting "for the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the
welfare of the minor, including the prevention or punishment of his
misconduct. " 192
In Boland v. Leska, 193 the Pennsylvania Superior Court relied on a
state statute which codified the Model Penal Code standard and held that
a step-father did not act with "malicious intent" when he administered
corporal punishment twice to his step-son. 194 The court determined
that the step-father was not trying to injure the child; he simply wanted
to show the child that he was angry and to discipline the child. 195
Thus, the court concluded that it found no evidence that the step-father's
motives were "improper." 196 Under the proposed standard for intent,
however, a court should reach the opposite conclusion. The fact that the
step-father was trying to show the child that he was angry, even though
he did not want to hurt the child, would be sufficient evidence of an
"improper" parental motive. A court would conclude that the step-father
was acting, at least in part, for his own purposes, and therefore, did not
have the appropriate intent to make the use of force justifiable.
The new test would require courts to distinguish between parents who
use corporal punishment to educate or discipline their children and those
who use it to express their anger or to humiliate or hurt their children. 197 Parents who fall into the first category are using physical
force to teach their children lessons about how to behave. For example,
a parent who slaps a child because the child is misbehaving in a public
place has the appropriate intent if the purpose of the slap is either to
communicate to the child that the behavior is unacceptable or to control

191. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08(l)(a) (1985).
192. Id.
193. 454 A.2d 75 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
194. Id. at 78.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. One possible objection is that this proposed standard for intent is too difficult
to apply because it requires courts to isolate the parents' intent in administering the
punishment. Courts would be required to distinguish between parental intent to educate
or discipline and intent that expresses parental anger or frustration with the child. A
response to this objection is that courts are well-equipped to determine parental intent
and have not found it difficult to ascertain in past cases. See id.
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the child's conduct. In contrast, parents in the second category do not
use physical force out of concern for their child's welfare; instead, they
are administering corporal punishment to express feelings of anger or
frustration toward a child. The mixed parental motive tolerated by the
Boland court under the current test does not take into account the child's
needs. In contrast, the new test requires that the parental intent behind
corporal punishment serve the child's interests rather than indulge the
parent's urges.
The second and third questions should be considered together because
they address related issues. These questions ask the parents to consider
to what were they responding when they administered the corporal
punishment and whether this use of force was consistent with the
behavior to which they responded. The current test does not require that
the parent's use of corporal punishment bear any relation to the child's
behavior, 198 but the new test correlates the two sets of behavior.
Under the new test, courts must balance the child's behavior against the
nature of the corporal punishment: the less severe the child's misconduct, the less appropriate it is to use corporal punishment to educate or
discipline the child. This factor improves on the old test because it
requires parents to justify their decision to use corporal punishment, and
it permits reasonable corporal punishment only in cases of severe
misbehavior. 199 Thus, the new test preserves children's rights to
bodily security in situations where those interests formerly received no
protection.
In Boland, for example, a court evaluating the parent's use of force
under the new test might have reached a different conclusion from the
one reached by the Pennsylvania Superior Court. 200 The court· determined that a step-father was taking appropriate "disciplinary measures"
when he grabbed his step-child and left neck bruises in one instance and
slapped the child on the face in another. 201 The court concluded that
these uses of force were reasonable, in part, because they "closely
followed errant behavior by the child."202 The child's "errant behav-

198. See Andrea Monsees, The Sometimes-Person: Legal Autonomy and the Child,
6 Ohio N.U. L. REV. 570, 579-80 (1979). This author found that "[t]here is no
requirement that the degree of punishment chosen by a parent be commensurate with the
act of the child." Id. at 579. She further stated that "[a] minor need not do anything
morally, legally, or ethically improper to be disciplined." Id. at 580.
199. This new test suggests that there are certain behaviors of childreri that cannot
justify corporal punishment. See infra notes 200-03 and accompanying discussion of
Boland v. Leska.
200. Boland, 454 A.2d at 78.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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ior" consisted of losing a sweater in the first instance and not responding
to his mother's questions about a missing item the second time. 203
Under the new standard, that behavior would not be considered severe
enough to warrant blows to the head leaving bruises. The incidents were
not severe because at least one, losing the sweater, was probably an
innocent mistake, and both were isolated and unrelated. Thus, a court
applying this new test could conclude that the parent had overreacted to
the child's minor infractions when he administered corporal punishment.
This new test, however, does not always sacrifice parental interests in
favor of children's rights. The application of the second and third
questions to a recent example of corporal punishment demonstrates how
the test protects parents who administer corporal punishment to help
their children. That situation involved a couple's decision to chain their
teenage daughter to the radiator to prevent her from roaming the streets
in search of drugs. 204 In 1991, Eliezer and Maria Marrero were
arrested and charged with unlawful imprisonment and endangering the
welfare of their fifteen-year-old daughter, Linda.205 For two months,
the couple had chained Linda to a radiator in their Bronx, New York,
apartment at night to prevent her from going out in search of drugs. 206
They took this drastic action immediately after two drug dealers came
to their apartment holding Linda at gunpoint and threatening to kill her
because she owed them money. 207 Their action also followed years of
unsuccessful efforts to get their daughter help through social service
agencies. After Linda became addicted to crack and began to roam the
city searching for drugs, her parents approached the Child Welfare
Administration, the police, Family Court, and a group home seeking
assistance in taking care of their daughter. 208 When no government
official responded, the Marreros sent Linda, who still drank from a baby
bottle, to Puerto Rico to live with relatives, but the relatives sent her

203. Id.
204.
Case Dropped in Chaining, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1991, at B3.
205. Id.
206.
David Gonzalez, Behind Girl's Chaining, Siren Call of the Streets, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 1991, at Al.
207. Id. at B6.
208. Id.; see also John T. McQuiston, Girl Chained by Parents Says She Wants to
Stay at Home, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1991, at Bl, B4 ("When I asked for help, they
wouldn't take me .... That's an injustice.").
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back home because they could not control her. 209 As Linda's departures from home lengthened and her drug use escalated, her parents
chained her by the left ankle to a radiator. They placed her in front of
a television, a VCR, a stereo, and video games.210 Mrs. Marrero
reflected on the situation: "I only had her chained for two months ....
There was nothing else for me to do. We are not criminals. We are just
people and we have the right to live."211 The charges against the
Marreros were soon dropped, and the family moved out of New York
City. 212 Linda spent two years· in a drug rehabilitation facility and then
left the facility, against her counselors' advice, to live with her family.
A month after she returned to her parents, she was charged with
assaulting another student at the school she was attending. 213
In answering the second question, a court would conclude that the
Marreros were responding to far more serious misbehavior than the
child's conduct in Boland.214 Therefore, the events leading up to the
Marreros' confinement of Linda justified their use of corporal punishment. Unlike the child who barely misbehaved in Boland, Linda was
out of control. Linda's inability to take care of herself was the primary
reason behind the Marreros' action? 15 In the same way that parents
do not allow their young children to wander alone outside because they
cannot take care of themselves, so too did Linda's parents seek to
prevent their daughter from going out alone because she could get hurt.
Linda's past behavior demonstrated that she was not capable of
controlling her own conduct: she used to leave home in search of drugs,
and she would resort to any measures to get them. The nature, duration,
and frequency of Linda's misconduct all contributed to the severity of
the situation. From the age of twelve, Linda roamed the streets iri search
of drugs; she often would return home battered and disheveled. 216
Furthermore, Linda had been disappearing for over three years. She was
leaving more often and for longer amounts of time and was becoming
more dependent on drugs. 217 In addition to responding to Linda's
long-standing pattern of disappearances into the street, the Marreros were

209.
Gonzalez, supra note 206, at B6.
210.
Id.
211. McQuiston, supra note 208, at Bl, B4.
212.
Evelyn Nieves, A Troubled Daughter Returns, Followed by Torment: Addict
Whose Parents Kept Her in Chains is Welcomed Home-and Then Arrested, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 2, 1994, § 1, at 21.
213.
Id.
214.
Boland v. Leska, 454 A.2d 75, 78 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
215. See McQuiston, supra note 208, at Bl.
216.
Gonzalez, supra note 206, at Al; McQuiston, supra note 208, at Bl.
217.
Gonzalez, supra note 206, at Al.
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confronting the more immediate problem of drug dealers' death threats
toward their daughter. 218 In sum, the severity of Linda's drug habit,
as evidenced by the desperate measures she took to get drugs, the length
of her addiction, and her increased absences from home, help to explain
why the Marreros took the steps that they did. The Marreros did not
confine Linda because they wanted to punish her for getting beaten up;
rather, they were trying to alter her behavior. The parents responded to
their daughter's needs with strong measures because they were trying to
save her life.
Turning to the third question, a court would conclude that the use of
force was consistent with the behavior to which it responded. The
Marreros' decision to chain their daughter inside the apartment may have
represented a unique response to the situation, but this use of force was
not excessive. The length of the punishment and the instrument used
only seem extreme when considered in isolation and not in the context
of the entire situation. During the day, Linda was allowed to wander
around the family's apartment. 219 When she was chained at night, she
had a television, video games, and a stereo to occupy her, and she slept
on a hideaway bed. 220 Although her confinement lasted for two
months, Linda had frequent visitors and was allowed to leave the
apartment during the day in the company of another family member or
friend. 221 A chain might not be considered a typical instrument of
corporal punishment; however, the Marreros used it to prevent Linda
from being hurt, not to hurt her. Moreover, Linda suffered no physical
or emotional injuries from being chained In fact, she professed that she
"loved her parents, wanted to be back home and understood why they
had disciplined her." 222 Therefore, the amount of time that she was
confined, the instrument used, and the absence of injury indicate that the
nature of the force used on Linda was reasonable.
The fourth question asks whether the corporal punishment could have
worked in the particular situation where it was used. Some people will
criticize this question as being too result-oriented. They will argue that
courts should not determine the reasonableness of parental behavior by
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.; see also Seth Faison, Jr., Teen-Age Girl Found Chained in Bronx
Residence, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1991, § 1, at 35.
McQuiston, supra note 208, at B 1.
222.
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looking at its consequences. Raising children is not a utilitarian
operation so parents should not be able to justify the use of force by
saying: "If it worked, then it is automatically good." The fourth factor,
however, does not endorse this approach; rather, it says the opposite: "If
corporal punishment could not have worked, then it is automatically
bad." Therefore, an affirmative answer to this question does not mean
that the parental use of force was reasonable. Courts would continue to
determine reasonableness based on all of the factors in the test.
One might argue that it is not always clear what it means for
something to work. Courts should define that concept to include cases
in which the use of physical force brings about even a temporary
improvement in the situation. This definition is best because it allows
parents to use corporal punishment as a tool of education and discipline.
If the use of physical force does not enable parents to teach or discipline
their children, then it does not work, and parents would concede that
there is no need to protect their right to administer it. Moreover, this
definition is easy to apply because it gives courts an objective way to
evaluate the success of the corporal punishment. Courts can simply look
to outward manifestations of behavioral changes in the child to
determine whether the corporal punishment worked. Those manifestations take the form of the child stopping or starting certain conduct or
somehow altering the behavior that got him or her into trouble. An
example shows how easy it is to apply this definition. If a child is
going to electrocute his sibling, the parent slaps the child's hand to get
him to drop the cord. The corporal punishment has worked because
slapping the child's hand caused him to stop the behavior which got him
into trouble. The parent does not have to work on long-term behavior
modification techniques to determine if the corporal punishment worked.
The immediate, short-term effect is sufficient to establish that the use of
force worked.
The strengths of this definition of the concept of working are apparent
when it is applied to the Marreros' use of corporal punishment on Linda.
The parents' chaining their daughter inside the apartment worked
because it brought about at least a temporary improvement in the
situation. The parents' decision to confine Linda temporarily improved
the situation because it safeguarded Linda's welfare at a dangerous time
in her life. The corporal punishment temporarily secured Linda's
welfare because it kept her off of the streets for two months, away from
drugs and drug dealers who had threatened her. Her confinement to the
apartment improved the situation because she stopped using drugs during
that period. In addition, the publicity surrounding her parents' decision
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to chain her led to her being placed in a residential treatment program.223 Admittedly, the Marreros' actions did not permanently
safeguard her welfare because she disappeared back onto the street both
immediately224 after her parents took off the chains and later after she
was released from the residential treatment facility. 225 However, even
though the corporal punishment did not permanently secure her welfare,
the corporal punishment worked because it improved Linda's behavior
during the time it was implemented and guaranteed her safety while it
was in effect.
This definition of what it means for corporal punishment to work
should be used instead of alternative meanings. For example, courts
should reject a definition that requires them to :figure out if the corporal
punishment has led the child to develop the internal controls he needs
to stop engaging permanently in certain behavior. Although society may
want corporal punishment to bring about long-term behavioral modification in a child, this definition is too ambiguous and subjective to be
applied consistently. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for courts
to assess the effectiveness of the corporal punishment on that level.
Courts would have to ascertain the child's state of mind to decide if he
or she had developed those internal controls, and that assessment is
beyond the courts' expertise. Moreover, this process would draw courts
into developing their own standards for evaluating the child's state of
mind. Those standards will vary based on the decisionmaker. Further,
they are based on the kinds of value judgments better left for the
legislature to make.
When that definition is applied to the Marrero situation, the issue
becomes whether the corporal punishment led Linda to develop internal
controls to permanently stop her self-destructive search for drugs. It is
obvious that the corporal punishment did not have that effect in Linda's
case. The definition asks a court to measure the long-term effectiveness
of corporal punishment at the time of trial, and it is impossible to predict
with certainty whether the corporal punishment will deter Linda from
returning to her old habits in the future. Furthermore, that definition
asks too much of parents. It demands that the temporary process of
administering corporal punishment guarantee permanent results. This

223.
224.
225.

Nieves, supra note 212, § 1, at 24.
Gonzalez, supra note 206, at B6.
Nieves, supra note 212, § 1, at 24.
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definition effectively deprives parents, such as the Marreros, of a shortterm solution to an immediate need and for which there may be no longterm answer.
An affirmative answer to the question of whether the corporal
punishment works does not necessarily mean that the court will find the
parental behavior reasonable. However, a negative answer does mean
that the court will find the parental behavior unreasonable. Thus, a
judicial determination that corporal punishment improves the situation,
even temporarily, allows the court to consider the reasonableness of the
force under the other parts of the test.
The fifth question asks whether the parents had any alternatives to
administering corporal punishment. This factor imposes an additional
burden on parents because they must consider other options before using
physical force to discipline their children. Under this standard, parents
cannot administer corporal punishment to children if other less restrictive
forms of discipline are available. Corporal punishment should be
considered a more extreme form of discipline than other methods, 226
such as taking privileges away from a child or simply talking to a child
about his misbehavior. It is more extreme because corporal punishment
teaches children that the use of physical force is an appropriate response
to a situation.227 Society punishes this use of force outside the parentchild situation228 so parental corporal punishment of children sends the
message that conduct not tolerated elsewhere is acceptable in this
context. The state cannot use physical force on adults in its custody if
it has alternative ways of exercising control over them. Similarly,
parents should not be able to use physical force on their children if they
have other less restrictive ways of exercising control over them.
Because the use of physical force is more onerous than other parental
actions and not tolerated in other contexts, parents should only employ
it if other less burdensome alternatives are not available to them.
226.
See, e.g., FACT SHEET, supra note 130, at 1 (discussing arguments against and
alternatives to corporal punishment in the public schools).
227.
Children who are abused are more likely to abuse others. This cycle of
violence means that parental use of corporal punishment will carry over from one
generation to another. See, e.g., LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN
SYNDROME 18-20 (1984) (noting that battering is a learned behavior that arises from
being abused as a child); CYNTHIA CROSSON TOWER, UNDERSTANDING CHILD ABUSE
AND NEGLECT 423 (2d ed. 1993) (suggesting that victims of abuse at a young age may
feel a need to "reconstruct the patterns of their childhoods" as a result of a feeling of
powerlessness).
228.
Many states ban the use of corporal punishment on prisoners. See, e.g.,
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 31 (West 1993) (stating that it is "unlawful for any person
to administer any corporal punishment of any kind to any inmate"). In addition, criminal
assault and battery statutes prohibit the kind of force tolerated in the form of corporal
punishment.
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A recent decision by the Supreme Court of Hawaii underscores the
importance of considering alternatives to corporal punishment in
deciding the reasonableness of the parental use of force. 229 In Hawaii
v. DeLeon, the court relied on a state statute that codified the Model
Penal Code standard for reasonable force when it determined that a
father's use of force against his teen-age daughter was not excessive. 230
The father decided to administer the punishment after he had told his
daughter repeatedly that she could not invite her friends over to the
house because they were a "bad in:fluence."231 After she continued to
do so, he further informed her that her continued disobedience would
result in her being "spank[ed] ... with a belt."232 The relevant statute
prohibited force "designed to cause or known to create a substantial risk
of causing death, serious bodily injury, disfigurement, extreme pain or
mental distress, or gross degradation."233 The Supreme Court of
Hawaii overturned the trial court's ruling and determined that the father
did not inflict "extreme pain" on his daughter. 234 According to the
court, the father's initial conduct did not violate the statute when he hit
his daughter between six and ten times on the thighs with a belt, causing
pain that lasted for an hour and a half, bruises that remained for one
week, and a trip to the emergency room. 235 Furthermore, the court
decided that the father had not caused his daughter "gross degradation"
when he later cut her waist-length hair up to her neck. 236
Under the new test, the DeLeon court would have to consider the
father's conduct in light of available alternatives and would reach a
different result. The father did not s_uggest that his daughter could see
her friends elsewhere; he did not "ground" her from going out; and he
did not threaten to take away any other privileges if she disobeyed his
orders. Instead, when his daughter broke the "house rules," the father
immediately resorted to severe, physical force. He first hit his daughter
so hard and so often that the police who were called to the scene
believed she needed medical attention, and then he cut off her hair. This
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Hawaii v. DeLeon, 813 P.2d 1382, 1383 (Haw. 1991).
Id. at 1383-84.
Id. at 1383.
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parental failure to try other less restrictive forms of discipline before
turning to physical force would make the father's conduct in DeLeon
excessive under the new test.
The requirement that parents must consider alternatives to corporal
punishment does not always favor children's interests over parents'
needs. Sometimes parents attempt alternative ways of disciplining or
educating their children, and the failure of these efforts underscores the
need to uphold their right of corporal punishment. Courts should assess
the reasonableness of the corporal punishment in light of the alternatives
available to the parents. In cases where parents have no alternatives to
using corporal punishment, courts should preserve that parental right.
This is particularly true if the state has played a role in depriving parents
of alternative ways of disciplining or educating their children. When the
state deprives parents of effective ways of controlling their children, it
should give them some other way to achieve the same ends. For
example, if the state has refused to make parenting classes, counseling,
or other services available to parents to help them cope with the
demands of parenthood, then it should not be able to take away their
only remaining effective tool of discipline: corporal punishment.
The Marreros' plight illustrates this problem. There, the state failed
to provide parents with workable alternatives to corporal punishment and
then penalized them when they turned to physical force as a last resort.
For almost three years, the couple struggled to figure out a way to keep
Linda off of the streets.237 The Marreros sought help from family and
friends and sent Linda to live in Puerto Rico, but no one could control
her. 238 The family could not afford to pay for private drug treatment
so they turned to the state for assistance. 239 Mrs. Marrero approached
the Child Welfare Administration, the Family Court, and the police in
search of someone to take custody of her daughter. 240 All of them
refused and left the Marreros with the responsibility of taking care of
Linda. When the Marreros tried to fulfill that responsibility by doing the
only thing they thought would work, 241 the state intervened and told

237.
Gonzalez, supra note 206, at Al.
238.
Id. at B6.
See Nieves, supra note 212, §1, at 21.
239.
240.
Gonzalez, supra note 206, at Al.
241.
Newman, supra note 154, § 4, at 12 ("[T]ime and again, Linda continued to
run away, and her parents felt that no one had a solution."); Nieves, supra note 212,
§ 1, at 21 ("[The Marreros] had no way to help her, they said, and did not know what
else to do with a daughter who had been running wild for years."); Gonzalez, supra
note 206, at B6 ("'It was the only way [Mr. Marrero] had to get her to abandon those
vices"') (quoting a neighbor of the Marreros).
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them. that they had exceeded the scope of their parental authority. 242
Even though the Marreros' use of physical force was the only thing that
kept their daughter off of the streets and away from. drugs, the state
arrested them. for endangering Linda's welfare. A public policy expert
com.m.ented on the Marreros' dilem.m.a:
The parents in this situation were absolutely at a loss for how they would
accomplish what society and what they themselves wanted for their child . . ..
Because no matter how much others try to say parents are to blame, they are
not giving them the tools to figure out the question of how to convince a child
not to do drugs. 243

The state conveyed a mixed message to the Marreros when it told them.
simultaneously not.to chain Linda at hom.e but to keep her safe and off
the streets.244 When the parents tried to protect their daughter the only
way they knew how, the state punished their efforts for being too
extreme. The state should not be able to take away the Marreros' only
means of safeguarding their daughter's welfare without putting
something in its place. When the state chose not to help Linda, it also
lost the power to dictate how others might help her. 245
Courts m.ay be reluctant to sift through alternatives to corporal
punishment and weigh them. to determine the reasonableness of. the use
of force. This reluctance could be based on the subjective nature of

242. Faison, supra note 221, § I, at 35.
243. Newman, supra note 154, § 4, at 12 (quoting Peter W. Forsythe, VicePresident, Edna McConnell Clark Foundation).
244. Id. Peter W. Forsythe, Vice-President of the Edna McConnell Clark
Foundation and a public policy expert, has commented on the state's conflicting
expectations of parents: "We're giving parents a mixed message . . . . We're saying
to them, 'We don't like the way you're disciplining your children, but we want you to
control them better."' Id.
245. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189
(1989), the Supreme Court considered whether a county social services agency was liable
under the Fourteenth Amendment for failure to protect a child from his father's repeated
beatings. Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist determined that the agency was not
liable because it had failed to act and had not entered into a special relationship with the
child that would give rise to an affirmative duty to act. Id. at 194-95. In dissent,
however, Justice Brennan wrote that the state had acted when it directed others to report
child abuse to the social services agency, received and investigated reports of abuse of
this child, failed to remove the child from his father's custody, and then represented that
it had taken care of the problem. Id. at 208-10 (Brennan, J., dissenting). According to
Justice Brennan, the state must do the job right once it agrees to do it. Id. at 210.
Similarly, the state must provide parents with alternatives to corporal punishment once
it decides to restrict their use of physical force.
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these determinations. Courts would be second-guessing parental
decisions to use force which may be made quickly and without
awareness of other options. In so doing, courts would be substituting
the values of individual decisionmakers for parents' values. For
example, a judge might believe that a parent had not thoroughly
explored alternatives to corporal punishment, while the parent had not
even thought of these options or had considered and discarded them in
light of superior knowledge about what works with that child.
There are two responses to this concern. First, courts are equipped to
evaluate the parental decision to use force in light of available alternatives. Courts have the job of determining the reasonableness of
individuals' conduct on a daily basis, and they are in the best position
to consider the parental use of force under all of the circumstances.
Judges and juries can draw on their own experiences to assess the
availability of less restrictive forms of punishment, and they should be
encouraged to do so. The availability of alternatives is simply one factor
in this balancing test. The weight of this factor probably would be
affected by how apparent the option was and how long the parent had
to think. Second, this factor ensures that courts will weigh the interests
of children in the balancing test. Children have an interest in being kept
safe from physical harm, and the requirement that courts consider the
parental use of force in light of less restrictive alternatives narrowly
circumscribes the scope of the parental right. Thus, the parameters of
the parental right of corporal punishment are limited to protect children's
rights to bodily integrity.
In sum, this five-part test gives courts, parents, and children a helpful
way to determine the reasonableness of the parental use of corporal
punishment. Because the political process safeguards the parental ability
to use corporal punishment, children do not have a voice in determining
whether a right should be recognized. That decision has already been
made for them. The only place where their voices can be heard is in
determining the scope of reasonable corporal punishment, and this new
test gives them that opportunity.
This new test is more sensitive to the needs of children than the
current standard is in several ways. First, it requires parents to search
for less restrictive alternatives to corporal punishment before using
physical force on their children. Therefore, parents must tum to corporal
punishment only as a last resort. Corporal punishment is not the
preferred means of discipline or education, but it is tolerated if there are
no available alternatives. Furthermore, this test evaluates the nature of
the physical force in light of the situation that precipitated that force and
requires a correlation between the two. Using this approach, the parental
use of force may be unreasonable if the circumstances do not justify it.
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Finally, this test is attentive to children's needs without sacrificing
parents' interests. This concern for parental rights can be seen in the
application of this test to the Marreros' situation. In that situation, a
court adopting this new test should conclude that the parental use of
force was reasonable because the parents were responding to a life-ordeath situation and had exhausted alternative forms of discipline.
Parents do not bear the exclusive responsibility for providing those
alternatives; the state should assist parents, such as the Marreros, who
ask for help when they cannot control their children. When the state
refuses to help, it cannot restrict the parents' ability to use corporal
punishment. The test thus balances the interests of parents and children
in a way that is sensitive to the needs of both groups.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court should not recognize a fundamental right of
parental corporal punishment. The Court cannot locate a source that
establishes such a right, and it should reserve that heightened constitutional protection for interests that cannot be safeguarded by the political
process. Because the political process adequately preserves parents'
ability to administer reasonable corporal punishment, courts should tum
their attention to protecting the interests of the politically isolated
minority--children. Courts can secure the interests of children in the
way that they define the parameters of reasonable corporal punishment.
The current test that courts use to draw the line between reasonable and
excessive force represents parents' interests at the expense of children's
rights. In contrast, the test proposed in this Article is sensitive to the
needs of children. The test requires courts to resolve all doubts in favor
of children and only permits corporal punishment if parents do not have
less restrictive alternatives available. Thus, this test admits the reality
of parental use of corporal punishment, but within that reality, seeks to
protect the interests of children.
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